Objective or Subjective – Anti-treaty shopping policy in select Asian jurisdictions in the post-BEPS world by BAIK, Andy & Petutschnig, Matthias
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy 
1-2018 
Objective or Subjective – Anti-treaty shopping policy in select 
Asian jurisdictions in the post-BEPS world 
Andy BAIK 
Matthias Petutschnig 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. 
For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104976 
 
 Jan 2018 
 
    
 
Singapore Management University 
School of Accountancy Research Paper Series Vol. 6, No. 1 
(Paper No: 2018-S-73) 
 Special Issue: Tax  
 
 
 
Objective or Subjective - Anti-treaty shopping policy 
in selected Asian jurisdictions in the post-BEPS 
world 
 
 
 
Andy Baik 
Matthias Petutschnig 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104976 
 
 
 
Objective or Subjective –  
Anti-treaty shopping policy in select Asian jurisdictions in the post-BEPS 
world 
 
Sunghak (“Andy”) Baik / Matthias Petutschnig1 
 
ABSTRACT 
BEPS Action 6 proposes two distinct anti abuse measures to be incorporated into the 
OECD Model Convention and subsequently into the various bilateral tax treaties: A 
Limitation on Benefits (LoB) clause and Principal Purpose Test (PPT). While both anti 
abuse measures are new to the OECD Model Convention, various countries around the 
world have implemented either LoB or PPT clauses or both into their tax treaties. This 
paper analyses the treaty network of eight Asian / Pacific jurisdictions (Australia, China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan) with respect to the anti-abuse 
measures employed in these treaties. The majority of the more than 500 treaties in 
the sample do not included an anti-abuse measure of any kind. While the use of anti-
abuse rules in general is highly diverse, the choice of the preferred measure if an anti-
abuse rule is incorporated in the treaty is quite homogeneous. The one measure most 
often used is the principal purpose test (or a variation thereof), with 113 individual 
treaties containing that test. LoB clauses are used in only 16 treaties. The historical 
development of the treaty networks shows a strong increase in the (relative) 
importance of the PPT since 43% of all new treaties concluded after 2009 contain such 
a provision while only 5% of these treaties contain a LoB. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2008, scientific literature2 and subsequently media reports have drawn attention to the fact 
that some highly profitable multinational companies seem to pay comparatively little to no corporate 
income tax especially in the source country. The effective tax rates on foreign profits of, for example, 
Google and Apple were reported to be 3% and 1%, respectively.3 The fact the some multinationals 
are able to considerably reduce their tax burden by exploiting national differences and loopholes in 
existing tax rules, often described as base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), suggests that the 
taxation of multinational firms is in need of reform.4 The necessity for reform is reflected by the 
intense public debate surrounding profit shifting and tax avoidance by multinational firms. Given that 
many countries face high levels of public debt and strong pressure to generate (additional) tax 
revenue, it is not surprising that this debate has brought the taxation of multinationals to the top of 
the international political agenda.  
In 2013 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a global 
action plan comprising 15 actions aimed at tackling base erosion and profit shifting of multinational 
enterprises (“BEPS Action Plan”).5 The BEPS Action Plan suggests a variety of legislative and 
administrative measures which aim at eliminating double non-taxation and under-taxation (i.e., a 
taxation level which is perceived as too low). After two years of intense work within the OECD and 
after numerous public consultations, the final reports on the actions were delivered on 5 October 
20156 and endorsed by the G20 in February 2016.7  
The OECD Action Plan and the final reports include a broad array of recommendations on domestic 
and/or bilateral measures aimed at preventing base erosion and profit shifting in the future. Existing 
domestic and international tax rules should be modified in order to more closely align the allocation 
of income with the economic activity that generates that income. The BEPS Action Plan identifies 
treaty abuse, and in particular treaty shopping, as one of the most important sources of BEPS 
concerns. The final report on Action 6, titled Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in 
Inappropriate Circumstances (“Action 6”), contains a comprehensive rule to limit or deny the benefits 
                                                          
 
2  See for an extensive literature review D. Dharmapala, "What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the 
Empirical Literature" (2014), 35 Fiscal Studies 12, 421–448. 
3  See note 2. 
4  See C. Fuest, C. Spengel, K. Finke, J.H. Heckemeyer and H. Nusser, "Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by Multinational 
Firms: Issues and Options for Reform" (2013) 5 World Tax Journal 3, 307-324. 
5  OECD (2013). Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. OECD. 
6  OECD (2015). BEPS Final Reports. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm. 
7  G20 (2016). Communiqué G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting. G20 Summit China. Available at: 
http://www.g20.org/English/Documents/Current/201603/t20160302_2182.html (25 Feb 2017). 
  
 
of a tax treaty when the treaty is purposefully used to attain unduly benefits. The proposed rule 
consists of an objective (“Limitation on Benefits clause” – LoB) and a rather subjective (“Principal 
Purpose Test” – PPT) anti-abuse measure. Although the BEPS Action Plan leaves some flexibility to 
the adopting countries, it expects that countries achieve a minimum standard of protection against 
treaty abuse. This could be achieved through either the combined inclusion of the LOB clause and the 
PPT rule or the inclusion of either the LOB clause or the PPT rule.8  
This paper analyzes the proposal made in Action 6 against the backdrop of the historical evolution 
and the current state of bilateral anti treaty abuse measures. With a special focus on eight 
Asian/Pacific jurisdictions9 and their treaty networks, the paper aims at providing guidance to 
domestic policy makers and bilateral treaty negotiators as to which proposed measure might be 
preferable to counter tax treaty abuse in the future. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First we discuss the final report of Action 6 and 
the proposed measures therein in section 2. Section 3 addresses the historical evolution of anti-
treaty-abuse measures while section 4 presents the current state of anti-treaty-abuse measures in 
the tax treaty networks of the eight jurisdictions covered. Building on these sections we present our 
conclusions, policy implications and recommendations in section 5. 
 
2. BEPS - Action 6  
The BEPS Action Plan identifies treaty abuse, and in particular treaty shopping, as one of the most 
important sources of BEPS concerns.10 Action 6 (“Prevent Treaty Abuse“) is specifically aimed at 
tackling this issue. The final report of Action 6 was published in the first set of deliverables in 
September 2014. The final report addresses three areas of the OECD’s work on treaty abuse:  
a) A clarification that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation. 
This clarification will inter alia change the official title of the OECD Model Treaty in a way that 
it covers the objective to avoid not only double-taxation but also double non-taxation. 
b) A set of Anti-Treaty Abuse provisions and/or domestic rules to prevent treaty abuse. 
c) Tax policy considerations that countries should consider before entering into a tax treaty. 
                                                          
 
8  See L. De Broe and J. Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse" (2014), 43 Intertax 2, 122-146. 
9  Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
10  See BEPS Action 6 Introduction. 
  
 
While Action 6 as well as the whole BEPS Action Plan seems to have a greater chance of being 
implemented than prior OECD initiatives on treaty abuse, tackling treaty abuse is, however, not a 
novelty. The conceptual foundations of Action 6 have been laid out already decades ago. Although 
the OECD’s work on treaty abuse started to develop in 1977,11 it was particularly the 2003 revision to 
the OECD Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Convention (OECD-MC) which offered tax 
authorities with ever stronger measures to counter treaty abuse.  
From 1977 until the 2003 revision, the Commentary emphasized that the purpose of tax treaties was 
to foster international trade and investment by eliminating international double taxation. It 
nonetheless added that tax treaties “should not, however, help tax avoidance or evasion.”12 The 
responsibility though was put on national legislators to enact domestic anti-avoidance rules to 
counter the exploitation of differences in domestic tax legislations. The 1977 Commentary 
recognized that domestic anti-avoidance measures could conflict with the provisions of tax treaties 
(treaty override) and thus provided that countries which had enacted domestic anti-avoidance rules 
may aim to “preserve the application of provisions of this kind” in their tax treaties.13  
The 2003 revision of the Commentary on Article 1 OECD MC saw a fundamentally change in the view 
of the OECD on the improper use of tax treaties and the relationship between domestic anti-
avoidance rules and tax treaties. The Commentary for the first time presented the prevention of tax 
avoidance or evasion as a self-standing14 – albeit ancillary – purpose of tax treaties.15 Additionally, 
the 2003 Commentary clarified that general anti-avoidance rules (“GAARs”) and/or judicial doctrines 
(such as substance-over-form, economic substance) are part of the basic rules for determining the 
tax liability.16 Such rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are neither affected by them nor 
considered a treaty override. The 2003 Commentary therefore contends that, as a general rule, there 
is no conflict between GAARs and judicial doctrines on one hand and tax treaties on the other.17  
                                                          
 
11  For a comprehensive historical overview of the Commentary on treaty abuse, see L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and 
Prevention of Abuse, IBFD, 2008, 377–386. 
12  See OECD Commentary (1977), Art. 1, 7. 
13  See L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2008, 377 et seq; L De Broe and J Luts, "BEPS 
Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146. 
14  The ‘principal’ purpose of tax treaties remained the prevention of double taxation, see B.J. Arnold, “Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: 
The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model” (2004), 58 Bulletin for International Taxation 6, 248. 
15  Including the prevention of treaty abuse as one of the purposes of a tax treaty would according to Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) require a treaty interpreter to take account of this object and purpose, as a consequence of 
which tax treaties might be interpreted to deny treaty benefits to abusive transactions (see B.J. Arnold and S. van Weeghel, “The 
Relationship between Tax Treaties and Domestic Anti-Abuse Measures”, in G. Maisto (Ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, 
Amsterdam, IBFD, 2006, 90; L De Broe and J Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146). 
16  See OECD Commentary (2003/2014), Art. 1, s. 9.2 and s. 22.1. 
17  See OECD Commentary (2003/2014), Art. 1, s. 9.2 and s. 22.1. 
  
 
Even though the 2003 Commentary did not provide a definition of what constitutes an abuse of tax 
treaties, it offers a ‘guiding principle’, which provides that the benefits of a double taxation 
convention should not be available when two elements, a subjective and an objective element, are 
present: 
a) “a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to secure a more 
favourable tax position” (subjective element); and  
b) “obtaining that more favourable treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the 
object and purpose of the relevant provisions” (objective element).  
However, it is also noted that “it should not be lightly assumed that a taxpayer is entering 
[purposefully] into [this] type of abusive transactions”.18 
The 2003 Commentary points out, that the fact that domestic (general) anti-abuse rules might apply 
to deny treaty benefits does not imply that (specific) treaty-based anti-abuse rules aimed at 
preventing particular forms of tax avoidance are unnecessary.19 In that respect, the 2003 
Commentary suggests a range of provisions (such as look through approach; subject-to-tax-clauses; 
limitation-on-benefits provisions) that treaty negotiators might consider.20 
The 2003 Commentary was ambiguously received by scholars, tax administrations and tax 
practitioners. While it was well received by certain scholars,21 it was widely criticized on various 
aspects by others.22 More importantly, various OECD Member States have made observations to the 
Commentary on Article 1 after the 2003 revision.23 Additionally, while scholars repeatedly refer to 
the significance and relevance of the Commentary of the OECD-MC while interpreting specific 
bilateral treaties modelled after the OECD-MC,24 the actual relevance of the Commentary is far more 
                                                          
 
18  See OECD Commentary (2003/2014), Art. 1, s. 9.5. 
19  OECD Commentary (2003/2014), Art. 1, s. 9.6. 
20  OECD Commentary (2003/2014), Art. 1, s. 12–21.5. 
21  See J. Sasseville, “A Tax Treaty Perspective: Special Issues” in G. Maisto (Ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2006, 
55 et seq. 
22  For example L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2008, 386–404; B.J. Arnold and S. van 
Weeghel, ‘The Relationship between Tax Treaties and Domestic Anti-Abuse Measures’, in G. Maisto (Ed.), Tax Treaties and Domestic 
Law, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2006, 89 et seq.; A.J.M. Jiménez, ‘The 2003 Revision of the OECD Commentaries on the Improper Use of Tax 
Treaties: A Case for the Declining Effect of the OECD Commentaries?’ (2004), 58 Bulletin for International Taxation 1, 17–18; B.J. 
Arnold, ‘Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model’ (2004), 58 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 6, 244; J.J. Zornoza Pérez and A. Báez, “The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model on Tax 
Treaties and GAARs: A Mistaken Starting Point” in M. Lang et al. (Eds.), Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010), 130. 
23  Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland made observations on the Commentary position to the relationship between 
tax treaties and domestic anti-abuse rules in general (see OECD Commentary, Art. 1, s. 27.4–27.9). 
24  Vogel argues – with reference to the High Court of Australia – that the Commentary on the OECD-MC is a guide to the current usage of 
terms by the parties to the treaty and thus an important source for interpretation of tax treaties (see K. Vogel, “Soft Law und 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen“, in M. Lang, J. Schuch and C. Staringer (eds.), Soft Law in der Praxis (Vienna: Linde, 2005), 145-148). 
  
 
limited.25  Thus a ‘soft-law’ measure such as amending the OECD Commentary can by far not achieve 
the same overall guidance and relevance as a ‘hard-law’ measure could achieve. The fact that the 
issue of treaty abuse, and in particular treaty shopping, has been identified by the OECD as one of 
the most important sources of BEPS implies that the 2003 revisions were unsatisfactory or that many 
states did not execute the OECD recommendations proposed therein.  
Action 6 now builds on the fundamental groundwork laid out in the 2003 revisions of the OECD 
Commentary but provides the 2003 amendments with a different and enhanced legal quality. The 
final report of Action 6 contains a specific anti-treaty abuse rule, which will be added to the OECD-
MC. Action 6 essentially proposes to migrate the 2003 amendments to the Commentary into the 
Model Treaty itself. This proposed Article X (“Entitlement to Benefits”) includes a rather objective 
anti-treaty abuse measure (Limitation-on-Benefits clause – Art X (1)-(5)) and a subjective anti-treaty 
abuse measure (Principal Purpose Test – Art X (7)). Subsequently all OECD Member States, the non-
OECD G20 states as well as all other countries which commit themselves to adhere to the principles 
laid out in the OEDC BEPS Action Plan are at least morally obliged to include an anti-treaty abuse 
measure in their tax treaties. This could be achieved through either the combined inclusion of the 
LOB clause and the PPT rule or the inclusion of either the LOB clause or the PPT rule.26  
 
2.1. Limitation on Benefits Clause 
Action 6 proposes to include a limitation-on-benefits (“LoB”) clause in the OECD-MC.27 Using LoB 
clauses is an approach that has long been pioneered by the United States,28 but is a concept which is 
neither foreign to the OECD member states as briefly discussed above, nor to other countries. In 
general, a LoB clause is intended to provide a more objective approach to ascertaining one’s 
qualification for treaty benefits (Article 1 OECD MC).29 By including a LoB clause, the contracting 
states express their wish to only grant treaty protection to taxpayers that, in addition to being 
residents, either  
                                                          
 
25  Mössner exemplifies the legal uncertainty that is connected to the Commentary showing that the German Federal Tax Court 
references the Commentary only when the Commentary supports the Court’s opinion, while completely ignoring the Commentary in 
all other cases (see J.M. Mössner, “Diskussion zu Klaus Vogel Soft Law und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen“, in M. Lang, J. Schuch and 
C. Staringer (eds.), Soft Law in der Praxis (Vienna: Linde, 2005), 149 et seq. 
26  See L. De Broe and J. Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146; P. Baker, “The BEPS Action Plan in the Light of EU 
Law: Treaty Abuse” (2015), 60 British Tax Review 3, 408-416. 
27  New Art. X (1) to (6) OECD MC. 
28  Compare Art. 22 of the US Model Convention. 
29  See L. De Broe and J. Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146; R.L. Doernberg and K. van Raad, “The 1996 United 
States Model Income Tax Convention. Analysis, Commentary and Comparison”, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 172; F.A. 
Vega Borrego, “Limitation on Benefits Clauses in Double Taxation Conventions”, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2006, 92–93 and 
115. 
  
 
a) carry out real business activities,  
b) have a sufficient nexus to their residence state; or  
c) have bona fide motives. 
These prerequisites are evaluated using a series of alternative tests. Persons that are residents of one 
of the contracting states need to satisfy at least one of those tests in order to be entitled to certain, 
or all, treaty benefits.30 However, only companies or other legal entities are assessed against these 
alternative tests. Individuals and governmental entities are deemed to regularly have bona fide 
motives per se, and treaty abuses by this heterogeneous group are seen as less common and thus 
not warranting filtration by a LoB test.31   
Because of its mechanical, rule-based nature, a LoB clause is considered to imply a greater amount of 
legal certainty in granting treaty benefits as compared to more subjective approaches, such as the 
PPT rule (see below).32 However, this benefit may also be one of its greatest drawbacks. Capturing 
situations of deemed treaty abuse with a number of mechanical tests necessarily implies that the LoB 
clause becomes an “awesomely complex and dense construct“.33  
Article X Paragraph 1 provides the general rule that a resident of a contracting state will only be 
entitled to a treaty benefit either if the resident is a qualified person (as defined in paragraph 2) or 
unless benefits are granted under the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4 or 5, at the time that the benefit 
would be accorded. The term treaty benefits mainly consist of the treaty’s distributive and relief 
rules, which limit the taxing rights of the contracting states (Articles 6–23 OECD-MC).34 In line with 
US-style LoB clauses, the protection of residents under Article 24 OECD-MC is also considered a 
treaty benefit subject to the LoB clause.35 Not deemed a treaty benefit however is the protection 
under Article 4(3) (corporate residence tie-breaker), Article 9(2) (downward transfer pricing 
                                                          
 
30  See J. Bates et al., “Limitation on Benefits Articles in Income Tax Treaties: The Current State of Play” (2013), 41 Intertax 6/7, 395 - 407. 
31  See S. Kolundzija, “OECD Minimum Standard: Comparing LOB and PPT”, in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse 
(Vienna: Linde, 2016) 355; L De Broe and J Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146; R. Szudoczky and P. Koch, 
“Limitation on Benefits: ‘Qualified Person’ – Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et al (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) (2016), 227; D. Dominguez, “Limitation on Benefits: Comparison between the US LOB and the OECD LOB proposed 
under Action 6”, in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse (Vienna: Linde, 2016), 305. 
32  See L De Broe and J Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146. 
33  J.C. Fleming, Jr., “Searching for the Uncertain Rationale Underlying the US Treasury’s Anti-treaty Shopping Policy” (2012), 40 Intertax 4, 
245-253; see also L. De Broe and J. Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146; B.M. Kerekes, “Limitation on 
Benefits Clauses – Function, Purpose and history” in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse (Vienna: Linde, 2016), 176.  
 The fact that 41 pages of the final report of Action 6 are devoted to the discussion of the proposed LoB clause is a perfect illustration of 
that complexity. In addition, the OECD itself admits in point 6 of Action 6 that “the administrative capacity of some countries might 
prevent them from applying certain detailed treaty rules and might require them to opt for more general anti-abuse provisions”. 
34  See M. Lang, BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties (2014), 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664; R. Szudoczky and P. 
Koch, “Limitation on Benefits: ‘Qualified Person’ – Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et al (eds.), Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS), 226. 
35  See F.A. Vega Borrego, Limitation on Benefits Clauses in Double Taxation Conventions, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2006, 95. 
  
 
adjustment) and Article 25 OECD-MC (mutual agreement procedure).36 Furthermore, as a LoB clause 
has a restrictive effect, it is only relevant if all other requirements of the treaty (e.g., being a resident, 
being the beneficial owner, etc.) have been satisfied.37 
Art X Paragraph 2 defines the qualified persons which are automatically entitled to all treaty benefits. 
It has six subparagraphs, each of which contains a category of residents that are qualified persons by 
reference to the attributes of these persons. In general, the concept of qualified persons comprises  
a) individuals;  
b) the two contracting states and subdivisions thereof; 
c) entities that successfully meet the stock exchange test; 
d) certain charitable organizations and pension funds; 
e) entities that meet the ownership and base erosion test; and 
f) certain collective investment vehicles.  
The subparagraphs c) - f) are linked to specific tests, which have in common that, once they are 
fulfilled, the person concerned is deemed to have a sufficient nexus with its residence state and the 
treaty benefits fully apply.38 However, some of these subparagraphs (especially (c) and (e)) are 
complex to administer and contain significant exceptions, which could impair the effectiveness of the 
LoB clause in countering treaty shopping.39  
The stock exchange test (Art X(2)(c)) is based on the assumption that because the shares of publicly-
traded companies are generally widely-held and are subject to stringent securities legislation, these 
companies are unlikely to be specifically established for treaty shopping purposes.40 Additionally, 
being listed on a stock exchange arguably requires a sufficient degree of nexus to a territory. 
However, the stock exchange test contains many newly introduced terms needing legal definitions 
(such as recognized stock exchange, principal class of shares, disproportionate class of shares). Some 
                                                          
 
36  See L. De Broe and J. Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146; R. Szudoczky and P. Koch, “Limitation on Benefits: 
‘Qualified Person’ – Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et al (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 226. 
37  See L. De Broe and J. Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146; L. De Broe, International Tax Planning and 
Prevention of Abuse, Amsterdam, IBFD, 2008, 739–741 and references there. 
38  See R. Szudoczky and P. Koch, “Limitation on Benefits: ‘Qualified Person’ – Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et al 
(eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 227; J. Bates et al., “Limitation on Benefits Articles in Income Tax Treaties: The Current 
State of Play”, 41 Intertax 6/7, 395 - 407; D. Dominguez, “Limitation on Benefits: Comparison between the US LOB and the OECD LOB 
proposed under Action 6”, in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse, 302 et seq. 
39  See J.C. Fleming, Jr., “Searching for the Uncertain Rationale Underlying the US Treasury’s Anti-treaty Shopping Policy”, 40 Intertax 4, 
245-253; R. Szudoczky and P. Koch, “Limitation on Benefits: ‘Qualified Person’ – Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et 
al (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 227. 
40  See F.A. Vega Borrego, “Limitation on Benefits Clauses in Double Taxation Conventions”, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2006, 
98; J. Bates et al., “Limitation on Benefits Articles in Income Tax Treaties: The Current State of Play”, 41 Intertax 6/7, 395 - 407; L. De 
Broe and J. Luts, "BEPS Action 6: Tax Treaty Abuse", 43 Intertax 2, 122-146; D. Dominguez, “Limitation on Benefits: Comparison 
between the US LOB and the OECD LOB proposed under Action 6”, in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse, 305. 
  
 
of these terms are extensively defined in paragraph 6 of the LoB clause, some however will definitely 
spark discussions, disagreement and dispute between taxpayers and tax administrations.41  
The ownership and base erosion test (Article X(2)(e)) contains two cumulative subtests that both 
need to be fulfilled. The two tests ensure that a majority of the equity (assessed by the ownership 
test) owners and non-equity (evaluated by the base erosion test) holders are residents of one of the 
contracting states. The ownership test prong of the proposed clause provides that at least 50% of 
each class of shares must be owned, directly or indirectly, by qualified persons themselves. The base 
erosion test prong is satisfied when less than 50% of the company’s gross income for the taxable 
period is paid or accrued to non-qualified persons. The rationale of the base erosion test is that non-
equity holders (creditors) could just as much as equity owners influence the decision making of the 
company and economically own a company.42 At a first glance, the mechanical nature of the 
ownership and base erosion test seems to allow a quick and reliable detection of treaty abusive 
structures; however it lacks clarity with respect to specific terms such as for example “gross 
income”43 and thus will still provide opportunities for creative tax planners.44 
Art X Paragraph 3 provides for an activity test, under which persons that would have been classified 
as non-qualified persons according to the Paragraph 2 may still become entitled to the treaty 
benefits. This however is only a limited entitlement to the treaty benefits only with respect to a 
particular item of income and only if that item of income is derived in connection with the active 
conduct of a business of that (otherwise non-qualified) person in its residence state, including 
activities conducted by affiliated persons.45 The activity test is rather complex, as it requires each 
time when income is obtained a verification of whether the recipient is engaged in the active conduct 
of a business in its residence state and the payment for which benefits are sought is related to that 
business.46 Or, if the income is derived from a business activity conducted in the source state or from 
                                                          
 
41  See for a comprehensive list of terms and concepts in need of further interpretation R. Szudoczky and P. Koch, “Limitation on Benefits: 
‘Qualified Person’ – Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et al (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 229 et seq; 
D. Dominguez, “Limitation on Benefits: Comparison between the US LOB and the OECD LOB proposed under Action 6”, in D. Blum and 
M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse, 306 et seq. 
42  See J. Bates et al., “Limitation on Benefits Articles in Income Tax Treaties: The Current State of Play”, 41 Intertax 6/7, 395 - 407; R. 
Szudoczky and P. Koch, “Limitation on Benefits: ‘Qualified Person’ – Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et al (eds.), 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 236 et seq. 
43  See further D. Dominguez, “Limitation on Benefits: Comparison between the US LOB and the OECD LOB proposed under Action 6”, in 
D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse, 306 t seq; R. Szudoczky and P. Koch, “Limitation on Benefits: ‘Qualified Person’ – 
Article X (1) and (2) of the OECD Model”, in M. Lang et al (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 237 et seq. 
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a related person, the business activity in the residence state should be “substantial“47 compared to 
the business activity generating the item of income in the source state. 
The term “active trade or business” remains widely undefined in Art X and therefore must be 
interpreted by reference to domestic law (Article 3(2) OECD-MC).48 However, the proposed LoB 
clause limits the scope of the term “business” as it provides that the business of making or managing 
investments for its own account cannot benefit from the activity clause, unless the relevant activities 
are conducted by a bank, an insurance enterprise or a registered securities dealer.49 
In summary, the active conduct of a business test implies economic substance in terms of premises, 
personnel and activities.50 However, this does not exclude all forms of treaty shopping especially not 
certain conduit arrangements.51 Therefore Action 6 additionally recommends that the LoB clause 
should be supplemented by an anti-conduit rule, which would either be the Principal Purpose Test 
(see below), or a separate treaty-based anti-conduit rule, or a domestic anti-abuse rule or judicial 
doctrine that would achieve a similar result. 
Art X Paragraph 4 is a so-called derivative benefits clause that allows certain entities owned by 
residents of third states to obtain treaty benefits if these residents are “equivalent beneficiaries“ who 
would have been entitled to equivalent benefits if they had invested directly in the source state. The 
underlying rationale of the derivative benefits clause is that treaty shopping cannot arise when the 
benefits provided by the specific tax treaty concerned would be available to the recipient in similar 
ways had the income been directly remitted to the ultimate recipient.52 This exception to the base 
erosion test is applicable in situations where the taxpayer who is a resident of state A receives 
income from a company in state B which received the income from sources in state C, and the tax 
treatment of the three-state structure is the same as it would have been had the taxpayer received 
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the income directly from state C.53 The derivate benefits clause contains again an ownership and 
base erosion test. Whereas the base erosion test is the identical to the one of paragraph 2,54 the 
ownership test is fulfilled if seven or fewer beneficiaries own (directly or indirectly) at least 95% of 
the shares.55 
Finally, Art X Paragraph 5 contains a so-called discretionary relief clause.56 Since the mechanical tests 
of the previous paragraphs might neither be comprehensive nor perfect, the competent authority 
may exercise discretion and grant benefits to taxpayers who fail these mechanical tests but 
nevertheless should be afforded treaty benefits as the establishment, acquisition or maintenance of 
a resident and the conduct of its operations did not have as one of their principal purposes the 
obtaining of treaty benefits.57 Discretionary relief shall only be granted on request of the taxpayer. 
The competent authorities may opt to accord all or a limited number of treaty benefits, and can only 
deny relief after having received (non-binding) input from the competent authorities of the other 
contracting state.58 
 
2.2. Principal Purpose Test 
Paragraph 7 of Article X contains a Principal Purpose Test, which, if the test is failed, denies certain 
treaty benefits even if the LoB clause resulted in a full application of the treaty.59 This limitation of 
the application of a tax treaty is derived from the treaty practice of the United Kingdom and several 
East-Asian countries60, where so called “main purpose test” provisions have been included in 
primarily the dividend, interest and royalty articles of many negotiated tax treaties in recent years.61 
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While the overall rationale of Article X(7) and of the main purpose test in the UK treaties might be 
the same, there are some differences. Maybe only a semantic difference but the OECD proposes a 
“principal purpose test” while the treaty practice contains “main purpose tests”. More significant is 
Article X(7)’s intent to govern all benefits of a treaty and not only the withholding tax reduction on 
passive income.62 The proposed Article X(7) reads as follows: 
“Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a benefit under this Convention shall 
not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having 
regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the 
principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that 
benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of this Convention.” 
The proposed Principal Purpose Test actually contains two separate tests in order to determine 
whether the benefit of the treaty should be granted in a specific case.63 The first test is a subjective 
test: is obtaining the treaty benefit one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction 
that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit? This subjective test is followed by a second, 
objective, test: the treaty benefit can still be granted if granting that benefit would be in accordance 
with the object and purpose of the relevant treaty provision(s).  
While the proposed Principal Purpose Test provision has these two tests, it is obvious that the main 
rule of Art X(7) is the subjective test. If the principal purpose of an arrangement or transaction is 
obtaining the treaty benefit, the PPT applies. The second test (object and purpose of a treaty) is only 
an exception to the main rule, which however could safeguard the application of the treaty. The 
interplay of these two requirements or tests is not trivial. Both tests contain undefined terms and 
expressions, and at first sight seem to use terms with different meanings synonymously. 
The first criterion which is very difficult to apply in practice is the essential application requirement 
for the proposed rule – the subjective criterion that “obtaining a benefit must be one of the principal 
purposes.” The main problem of this criterion is the practical difficulties involved in proving an 
intention.64 The final report of Action 6 though states that the question whether “obtaining a benefit 
is one of the principal purposes” of a specific arrangement can be and needs to be answered by an 
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‘‘objective analysis of the aims and objects of all persons involved.’’65 The aim of this ‘‘objective 
analysis’’ is to draw conclusions on the intention of the transacting party at issue. The result of the 
Principal Purpose Test though depends exclusively on the intention and the proof of the intention of 
the transacting parties. While such subjective criteria can always be deduced on the basis of external 
facts, the underlying intentions and motives though are very difficult to prove.66 Therefore and with 
good reasons, legislators abstain, when possible, from attaching fiscal consequences to the existence 
of such an intention.  
The main issue with such subjective rules67 is that the rules on the burden of proof effectively 
determine the result of the test and not the actual intention.68 So if the tax authority has to prove 
that one of the main objectives of the taxpayer was to obtain the treaty benefit, it is already fighting 
a losing battle. Conversely, the taxpayer has no chance of fending off the accusation of abuse if it has 
to present evidence that benefiting from one or several treaty provisions was not one of the primary 
motives. Taxation and the application of a tax treaty would thus be determined solely by a 
procedural question.  
To, at least prevent bilateral disagreement on the outcome of the Principal Purpose Test due to 
diverging domestic rules on the burden of proof, Article X(7) regulates it somewhat itself. The legal 
consequences of Article X(7) apply if it is “reasonable to conclude” that one of the main objectives of 
the taxpayer was to obtain the benefits of the tax treaty.69 At a first glance, this puts the burden of 
proof into the tax authority’s hands, which has to draw this conclusion and justify it.70 However as it 
must only be ‘‘reasonable’’ but not compelling, these requirements arguably are not overly 
demanding. Therefore, the tax authority does not need to produce full evidence.71 While Article X(7) 
thus attempts to establish a balance between the interests of the tax authority and those of the 
                                                          
 
65  Action 6 page 57. 
66  See M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664; E. Pinetz, “Use of a Principal 
Purpose Test to Prevent Treaty Abuse” in M. Lang et al (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) (Vienna: Linde, 2016), 284; S. 
Kolundzija, “OECD Minimum Standard: Comparing LOB and PPT”, in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), Preventing Treaty Abuse, 362; see 
further US Treasury Department, Technical Explanations to the US-Model Tax Treaty 2006, Art 22. 
67  One current example in treaty law is Article 19(1)(b)(ii) OECD-MC, according to which the state of residence has the right to tax income 
from government when the services are rendered in the residence state and the individual “did not become a resident of that State 
solely for the purpose of rendering the services.” 
68  See E. Pinetz, “Use of a Principal Purpose Test to Prevent Treaty Abuse” in M. Lang et al (eds.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 
284; M. Seiler, “GAARs and Judicial Anti-Avoidance in Germany, the UK and the EU”, 208. 
69  See P. Baker, “The BEPS Action Plan in the Light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse”, 60 British Tax Review 3, 408-416. 
70  See M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664; E. Pinetz, “Use of a Principal 
Purpose Test to Prevent Treaty Abuse” in M. Lang et al (eds.), “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)”, 284 et seq. 
71  See M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664; E. Pinetz, “Use of a Principal 
Purpose Test to Prevent Treaty Abuse” in M. Lang et al (eds.), “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)”, 284; P. Baker, “The BEPS Action 
Plan in the Light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse”, 60 British Tax Review 3, 408-416. 
  
 
taxpayer, the bias in favor of the tax authority is however fairly obvious.72 In practice, presenting 
unequivocal evidence of the motives will therefore not be necessary and tax authorities will be 
tempted to presume intention simply because of the presence of the benefit.  
The final report of Action 6 makes it rather straightforward for tax administrations to assume an 
abuse. It is by no means required that the sole purpose of the arrangement/transaction must aim at 
obtaining a tax benefit. It does not even have to be the essential, the principal, or the main 
purpose.73 Instead, it suffices if one of the main purposes of an arrangement/transaction is to obtain 
a benefit. Thus, the rule assumes that not merely one main purpose but two or even multiple main 
purposes may exist for a specific transaction, arrangement or structure. So, even if the taxpayer can 
prove that the arrangement chosen is (also) motivated by non-fiscal reasons, the tax authority can 
rebut that and the anti-abuse rule would apply.74 The rule would even apply if the taxpayer’s main 
purpose was a non-fiscal one. It remains unclear how tax administrations and eventually courts 
would distinguish between main purposes and secondary purposes, but also between different main 
purposes.75 This distinction, however, is critical for the application of Article X(7) and thus for the 
foreseen legal consequences. This is even more critical as tax treaties are interpreted by different 
national courts. National courts may reach completely different judgments (with respect to the same 
treaty and even with respect to the same case) and they are often unable to free themselves from 
the fiscal interests of their state.76  Arbitrary decisions by tax authorities, an increase in the number 
of court proceedings, diverging tax treaty interpretations by these courts and a reduction of legal 
certainty might be the result. The result would be increased instances of double taxation and a 
further erosion of the desired uniformity in application of tax treaty provisions – the actual opposite 
of what was the aim of the OECD BEPS Action Plan. 
While it is highly unclear how to define and evidence that “one of the principal purposes” was to 
obtain a treaty benefit, it is also unclear what treaty benefit is in question. At first, it seems fairly 
                                                          
 
72  See M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664; P. Baker, “The BEPS Action 
Plan in the Light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse”, 60 British Tax Review 3, 408-416; S. Kolundzija, “OECD Minimum Standard: Comparing LOB 
and PPT”, in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), “Preventing Treaty Abuse”, 363. 
73  See M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664; E. Pinetz, “Use of a Principal 
Purpose Test to Prevent Treaty Abuse” in M. Lang et al (eds.), “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)”, 286; P. Baker, “The BEPS Action 
Plan in the Light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse”, 60 British Tax Review 3, 408-416; M. Seiler, “GAARs and Judicial Anti-Avoidance in Germany, 
the UK and the EU”, 209; A. Bhargava, ”The Principal Purpose Test: Functioning, Elements and Legal Relevance” in D. Blum and M. 
Seiler (eds.), “Preventing Treaty Abuse”, 319. 
74  See M. Seiler, “GAARs and Judicial Anti-Avoidance in Germany, the UK and the EU”, 209; M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an 
Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664. 
75  See E. Pinetz, “Use of a Principal Purpose Test to Prevent Treaty Abuse” in M. Lang et al (eds.), “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS)”, 287; M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664; A. Bhargava, ”The 
Principal Purpose Test: Functioning, Elements and Legal Relevance” in D. Blum and M. Seiler (eds.), “Preventing Treaty Abuse”, 319 et 
seq. 
76  See M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties”, 74 Tax Notes Int’l 7, 655-664. 
  
 
obvious that the “treaty benefit” must be a benefit resulting from the application of the treaty itself 
and not some benefit granted on the basis of domestic law or a different treaty.77 All treaty 
provisions that do not effectively change the taxpayer’s tax position, such as the definitions in Article 
3 or Article 4 of the OECD-MC do not by themselves lead to any benefits for the taxpayer.78 Even the 
rules on the personal and substantive scope of application of the tax treaty (Articles 1 and 2 OECD-
MC) do not convey a benefit.79 In the end, such a benefit must result either from the distribution 
rules (Articles 6 to 8 and 10 to 21) and usually in the source state, or from the methods article (Article 
23A/B OECD-MC) in the residence state.80  
With a “benefit of the treaty”, Action 6 obviously means that the tax position would have to improve 
for the taxpayer as a result of the application of one or several treaty provisions as compared with 
the domestic law.81 But does this refer to the overall tax burden in both contracting states combined 
or does it refer to the difference between tax burdens in one contracting state with or without 
application of the treaty?82 For example, if the structure chosen by the taxpayer aims at a reduction 
of withholding taxes, this would reduce the tax burden for the taxpayer in the source state but not 
necessarily the overall tax burden. The reduced withholding tax only has an impact on the 
distribution of the taxation rights between the two states.83 The taxpayer benefits only marginally 
(i.e., the reduced source country withholding tax) while the residence state obtains a benefit in the 
form of a lower foreign tax credit allowance to the taxpayer and therefore a higher tax revenue from 
the source country payment.  Whether it is sufficient to assume a “benefit” for the taxpayer in a 
scenario where the structure only reduces compliance cost and possibly financing costs such as in the 
example above is debatable.  
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Summing up, the Principle Purpose Test proposed in Article X(7) in Action 6 is a highly complex and 
very vaguely written rule. This type of subjective test focusing on the intentions of the taxpayer has 
been broadly criticized in the literature.84 It contains a range of terms and concepts that need further 
interpretation and clarification. It is neither clear what determines a “principal purpose” nor what 
could be considered a “treaty benefit”. Furthermore, the rule potentially shifts the burden of proof 
towards the taxpayer who then has to evidence that the actions taken were not aimed at obtaining a 
certain treaty benefit. It is rather trivial that furnishing proof that an intention did not exist when 
such an intention might be deducible from the outcome of the transaction is virtually impossible. The 
tax administration could easily assume that it is “reasonable to conclude” that one of the principal 
objectives of the taxpayer was to obtain the benefits of the tax treaty. For taxpayers, and also for tax 
administrations, this inevitably will lead to more legal uncertainty and higher compliance and 
litigation costs.  
 
3. Anti Treaty Abuse measures – historical and current perspectives  
3.1. Evolution of the U.S. LoB clause 
The United States first started in 1939 to conclude tax treaties with important trading partners 
aiming to encourage international investment flows by reducing the burden of double taxation.85 
While the first tax treaties such as, for instance, the 1948 U.S.-Netherlands Treaty86 applied only to 
the treaty partner itself and not to their overseas possessions,87 during the 1950s most of these 
treaties with European trading partners were extended to their overseas possessions. After their 
independence many of those former European colonies, especially the former British colonies of the 
Caribbean had become tax havens.88 Thus, by rewriting their domestic tax laws, some countries took 
advantage of the extension of the U.S. tax treaties,89 which was the beginning of what is now 
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commonly referred to as “treaty shopping”90. From that point on, U.S. lawmakers became concerned 
about that new phenomenon, stating that an income tax treaty providing benefits that can be 
claimed by all residents of the other contracting state would pose a high risk of abuse by third-
country residents91 interposing a conduit company to invest in the U.S. and thus be indirectly eligible 
to the treaty benefits, leading to the effect that other countries would have reduced incentives to 
enter into treaty negotiations with the United States.92 
 
The first foundations of what would later become the U.S. standard Limitation on Benefits provision, 
which is nowadays included in almost all U.S. tax treaties, however dates back to the 1945 U.S.-U.K. 
tax treaty.93 That treaty provided for a general (15%)94 and a special (5%)95 withholding tax rate on 
dividends. In order to qualify for the special 5% withholding tax rate, both an ownership test and an 
active business test had to be met.96 However, even if these two tests were met, the reduced 
withholding tax rate of 5% would not have been applicable in case “the relationship of the two 
corporations has been arranged or has been maintained primarily with the intention of securing such 
reduced rate.”97 This so called “arranged or maintained” test aimed at ensuring that only legitimate 
corporations benefitted from the reduced withholding tax rate.98 The rule was purely subjective as it 
was based solely on the taxpayer’s intent and therefore difficult to enforce.99 The “arranged or 
maintained” rule though appeared in several subsequent U.S. income tax treaties signed in the 
1950s.100 The 1945 U.S.-U.K. treaty thus can be seen as the first precursor to Article X(7) of Action 6.  
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Working Paper No. 182 (2010). 
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92  M.F. Huber and M.S. Blum, “Limitation on Benefits Under Article 22 of the Switzerland-U.S. Tax Treaty”, 39 Tax Notes Int’l 6, 547-568; 
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94  1945 U.S. – U.K. tax treaty, Art. VI(1). 
95  1945 U.S. – U.K. tax treaty, Art. VI(1). 
96  1945 U.S. – U.K. tax treaty, Art. VI(1). 
97  1945 U.S. – U.K. tax treaty, Art. VI(1). 
98  See H.J. Levine and M.J. Miller, “U.S. Income Tax Treaties – The Limitation on Benefits Article” (Portfolio 936); I.K. Sugarman, “The U.S.-
Netherlands Income Tax Treaty: Closing the Doors on the Treaty Shoppers,” 17 Fordham Int'l L.J. 3, 776-824. 
99  See R.J. Rolfe and T.S. Doupnik, “The United States Attempts to Crack Down on Treaty Shopping”, 38 Tax Executives 325 (1986). 
100  E.g., Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland. 
  
 
The 1962 U.S.-Luxembourg treaty101 contained the first separate anti-treaty shopping provision 
specifically aimed at limiting benefits under the treaty to those persons who were citizens or residents 
of one of the contracting states102 by disallowing any treaty benefits to “any holding company entitled 
to any special tax benefit under Luxembourg Law (…), or to any income derived from such companies 
by any shareholder thereof.”103 Thus, this approach provided a renunciation from the purely subjective 
“arranged or maintained” test towards a more objective test, which disregards the motives for 
establishing the structure.104 However, due to the absence of such a provision in other treaties of this 
time, Article 15 of the 1962 U.S.-Luxembourg treaty was not successful in preventing treaty shopping 
overall as taxpayers were using alternative holding locations.105 While the U.S. negotiated new tax 
treaties with a number of countries over the following years,106 none of these treaties contained a 
limitation on benefits clause of any sort,107 with the exceptions of the Treaty with Trinidad and 
Tobago108 and with Finland109 in 1970.  
In 1977, the United States published a Model Treaty110 to act as a coherent guide for future treaty 
negotiations.111 The 1977 U.S. Model Treaty included a Limitation on Benefits article, which denied 
treaty benefits to a company resident in a contracting state if more than 25% of the company’s capital 
is owned by non-residents and if by reason of special measures the dividend, interest, or royalty 
income of the company is taxed at a substantially lower rate than its regular corporate profits.112 This 
approach of the two-part “special measures” and “foreign ownership” test was however only effective 
                                                          
 
101  Convention Between the United States of America and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Property, signed on Dec. 18, 1962 (1962 U.S.-Luxembourg tax treaty).  
102  See H.J. Levine and M.J. Miller, “U.S. Income Tax Treaties – The Limitation on Benefits Article” (Portfolio 936); I.K. Sugarman, “The U.S.-
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Trinidad and Tobago (1966), and France (1969). 
107  Notably, the U.S. government had not completely given up developing Limitation on Benefits provisions during the 1960s. Two 
proposed treaties (Israel, 1965 and Brazil, 1967), none of which entered into force, included separate Limitation on Benefits provisions 
that were similar to Article 15 of the 1962 U.S.-Luxembourg treaty, but made various refinements (see further H.J. Levine and M.J. 
Miller, “U.S. Income Tax Treaties – The Limitation on Benefits Article” (Portfolio 936)). 
108  The Convention between the Government of the United States of America and Trinidad and Tobago for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, and the Encouragement of International Trade and 
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109  The Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Finland for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Mar. 6, 1970,, 22 
U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042 (“1970 U.S.-Finland Treaty”). 
110  U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of 1977 (“1977 U.S. Model Treaty”).   
111  See I.K. Sugarman, “The U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty: Closing the Doors on the Treaty Shoppers”, 17 Fordham Int'l L.J. 3, 776-
824; see 1977 U.S. Model Treaty. 
112  See M.F. Huber and M.S. Blum, “Limitation on Benefits Under Article 22 of the Switzerland-U.S. Tax Treaty”, 39 Tax Notes Int’l 6, 547-
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when a corporation was subject to a substantially reduced special tax rate compared to the generally 
applicable tax rate.113 Thus, in case a country’s tax system imposed very low corporate tax rates in 
general, this Limitation on Benefits article did not provide for effective countering of treaty abuse.114 
Until the publication of the 1996 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, several specific bilateral treaties 
as well as the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty brought some important developments. The 1978 Protocol115 
to the 1968 U.S.-France treaty116 introduced a so called derivative benefits rule. Under this rule, 
treaty benefits were still granted to nonresident shareholders where comparable benefits were 
available to them under another treaty with the source country.117 Further, the first “public 
company” exception to the ownership test as well as the first anti-conduit limitation to treaty 
benefits were included in that 1978 Protocol.118 The 1980 U.S.-Jamaica tax treaty119 was the first 
treaty to include a base erosion test, stating that a company’s income could not be “used in 
substantial part to meet liabilities to persons who are residents of a State other than a Contracting 
State”.120 Furthermore, Article 17 of the 1980 U.S.-Jamaica tax treaty was the first Article expressly 
entitled “Limitation on Benefits”. Notably, this treaty was also the first treaty in force to include a 
generally applicable “public company” test.121 
The 1981 U.S. Model Treaty122 significantly changed the Limitation on Benefits clause.123 The scope 
was extended to trusts and other entities.124 The denial of treaty benefits was extended to all forms 
of income, not only passive income.125 The limitation on benefits was based on foreign ownership 
(less than 25% foreign ownership) and special measures.126 A base erosion test was added which 
denied treaty benefits if a substantial part of the income was paid to residents of a third country as 
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122  United States Dept. of Treasury Model Income Tax Treaty, June 16, 1981. 
123  See M.F. Huber and M.S. Blum, “Limitation on Benefits Under Article 22 of the Switzerland-U.S. Tax Treaty”, 39 Tax Notes International 
547 (2005); I.K. Sugarman, “The U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty: Closing the Doors on the Treaty Shoppers,” 17 Fordham Int'l L.J. 
3, 776-8247.  
124  See R.J. Rolfe and T.S. Doupnik, “The United States Attempts to Crack Down on Treaty Shopping”, 38 Tax Executives 325 (1986). 
125  See R.J. Rolfe and T.S. Doupnik, “The United States Attempts to Crack Down on Treaty Shopping”, 38 Tax Executives 325 (1986). 
126  See term “and” following paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b); the term “special measures” has been removed from the text. 
  
 
interests, royalties or other deductible payments.127 Additionally, two safe harbor provisions were 
added – one for publicly traded companies128 and one for taxpayers who could prove that the 
principal purpose for establishing the company structure was not aimed at receiving the treaty 
benefits.129 Since the release of the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, a LoB article has been included in every 
U.S. tax treaty entered into after the release.  
Besides changes in the details and structure of the wording of the respective limitation on benefits 
clauses found in U.S. treaties, the 1982 U.S.-New Zealand130 and the 1982 U.S.-Australia131 tax treaties 
contained a new provision specifically related to income derived by a trustee. With the U.S.-Italy Tax 
Treaty Protocol in 1984, the U.S. tax treaty policy with regards to the ownership threshold (75%) was 
liberalized as this high ownership requirement was seen as an obstacle to bona fide structures forming 
a real business.132 Thus a 50% ownership threshold was introduced and included in tax treaties 
negotiated and signed throughout the 1990s.133 
The Limitation on Benefits article in the 1989 U.S.-Germany tax treaty134 was the first article 
representing all elements of a modern limitation on benefits clause and was received by the tax 
community as a major innovation135 and has been used as a model for subsequent treaty 
negotiations.136 Under that provision, three alternative methods for qualifying for treaty benefits were 
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provided. First, under the so called “automatic qualification”, five classes of persons, including 
individuals, the U.S. or German government, public companies, non-profit organizations137 and persons 
satisfying a more than 50% ownership test as well as a base erosion test, were automatically eligible 
to treaty benefits.138 The second alternative was the so called “Active Business Connection Test” on a 
subjective basis which replaced the “Principal Purpose Test” of prior treaties.139 In order to be entitled 
to treaty benefits under the Active Business Connection Test a person must be engaged in the active 
conduct of a trade or business in the residence state and, additionally, the income derived from the 
other State must be connected with that trade or business.140 As a third alternative, the provision 
contains a “safety-valve” under which the sovereign parties to the treaty are allowed to grant treaty 
benefits on a discretionary basis, after considering all relevant facts and circumstances of the case.141 
The 1996 U.S. Model Treaty included an amended Limitation on Benefits clause (Article 22).142 It 
repealed the Principal Purpose Test, which was based on the taxpayer’s intent, which a tax 
administration is usually ill equipped to identify, altogether.143 In order to avoid such a difficult burden 
of proof for the tax administration, the amended Article 22 contained a series of objective tests.144 The 
rationale underlying each of the tests is that a taxpayer who is able to satisfy one or more of these 
requirements probably has a real business purpose in respect of the established structure or has a 
sufficiently strong nexus to the other contracting state that outweighs any purpose to obtain the treaty 
benefits.145 
Article 22 of the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty included significant changes to the former Limitation on 
Benefits clause under the 1996 U.S. Model treaty, intending to make it more difficult for third-country 
residents to benefit inappropriately from tax treaties between two countries.146 Article 22 of the 2006 
U.S. Model Treaty again, just like the approach adopted by the 1996 U.S. Model Treaty, contained a 
list of persons that were entitled to treaty benefits with no restrictions (individuals, publicly traded 
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companies, governments, political subdivisions and local authorities of a contracting state) – however 
the scope of that list is much narrower as entities owned by the treaty state and governmental pension 
funds are excluded.147 Further, the safe harbor rule of the 1996 U.S. Model Treaty for a substantial 
trade or business has been removed, leaving substantiality to be determined solely on a facts and 
circumstances basis.148 And, the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty does not include special derivative benefits 
rules or rules for triangular arrangements anymore. However, the subsequently agreed treaties and 
protocols with Bulgaria,149 Malta,150 New Zealand151 and France152 all provide for a derivative benefits 
rule. 
On 17 February 2016, the US Treasury Department released a revised US Model Income Tax 
Convention (“2016 U.S. Model Treaty”).153 The 2016 U.S. Model Treaty includes a further improved 
LoB clause (Article 22), which contains some of the developments in treaty practice from the 
previous 10 years. Article 22(2)(f) of the 2016 U.S. Model Treaty reintroduces the derivative benefits 
test which, if the more stringent conditions (relative to the past) are satisfied, maintains treaty 
benefits for a company which is held at least 95% by (seven or fewer) non-residents of either 
contracting state as long as this third state also has a comprehensive tax treaty with the United 
States.154 The derivative benefits allowance however is also subject to the base erosion test, which 
denies the benefits if 50% or more of gross income of this company is paid or accrued in form of 
deductible payments to “bad recipients” (e.g., non treaty residents). The 2016 U.S. Model Treaty 
adds to the LOB article a provision that permits companies that serve as the active headquarters 
company of a multinational corporate group (“headquarters companies”) to receive treaty benefits 
though limited to withholding tax reductions on dividends and interests. This new headquarters 
companies test (Article 22(5)) requires a holding company to exercise primary management and 
control functions (and not just supervision / administration) in its residence state with respect to 
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itself and its geographically diverse subsidiaries.155 Additionally, the headquarters test also includes a 
base erosion test. For publicly traded companies the fulfillment of the stock exchange clause gets 
more difficult as Article 22(2)(c)(i) requires that the stock exchange must be in the same country as 
the company is in. This rule is intended to address “inversion” transactions in which U.S. companies 
inverted to tax favorable jurisdictions such as for example Bermuda, held the board meetings in 
Barbados to qualify under the US-Barbados treaty, and claimed exemption from the LoB clause 
because they were publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange.156 Further, the 2016 U.S. Model 
Treaty makes some changes in the detailed wording of the active trade or business test (Article 
22(3)).  
 
3.2. The U.K. Main Purpose Test 
The concept of a “main purpose test” as a measure against treaty shopping has long been present in 
U.K.’s domestic and international tax law and still it is very scarcely researched in the international 
literature. Since as early as the 1920s, the United Kingdom has had anti-avoidance legislation that 
targeted certain types of transactions, i.e., specific anti-avoidance provisions. The distinctive feature 
of these provisions was that it generally tested the motive of the taxpayer behind the transaction.157 
Further on, in the 1960s the domestic income tax law provided for a rule to disregard transactions 
that did have “as their main object, or one of their main objects, to enable tax advantages to be 
obtained”158. The rule was an anti-avoidance rule aimed at dividend-stripping and bond-washing 
transactions, which had proved resistant to specific anti-avoidance rules. To not impact legitimate 
commercial transactions, the legislation would not affect bona fide commercial transactions or those 
carried out in the normal course of making or managing investments, unless the (or one of the) main 
object(s) of the transactions was tax avoidance.159 The main purpose test next appeared in 1977 – to 
counter capital gains tax avoidance schemes,160 it denied tax relief if a reorganization or 
reconstruction was “part of a scheme or arrangements of which the main purpose, or one of the main 
purposes, is avoidance of liability to capital gains tax or corporation tax“. Again, a bona fide 
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commercial reason was required for the transactions. Nowadays, similarly worded specific anti-
avoidance provisions can be found throughout the UK domestic income tax system.161 
As with the proposed “Principal Purpose Test“ of Action 6, the key issues with the “main purpose 
test“ evolve around the question of how to identify the purpose of a particular arrangement and 
what purpose is the “main purpose“. In this respect, the British case law has developed some 
guidance. First, the “main purpose test“ does not automatically assume that every transaction is 
exclusively performed for the purpose of tax avoidance.162 Secondly, the mere existence of a tax 
advantage and also the knowledge that a certain structure will lead to a tax advantage (even if the 
structure has been recommended by tax advisors) also does not automatically constitute a “main 
purpose“.163 However, the relative size of the tax advantage in relation to the transaction volume 
seems to be one of the important factors. If the tax advantage is a mere "icing on the cake" it will not 
constitute a main purpose.164 The “main purpose test“ is thus a question of whether the tax position 
was an end in itself, or just an incidental improvement to the bona fide commercial transaction.165  
At the tax treaty level, already in 1945 the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty used the term “primarily with the 
intention” in order to determine which arrangements of the taxpayer should not be allowed 
application of the reduced tax treaty rates.166 In the 1970s the United Kingdom started to generally 
include this specific anti-treaty shopping rule into their double tax treaties. The first of such 
provisions from this era could be found in the 1976 U.K.-Ireland Tax Treaty.167 These provisions are 
usually not separate treaty articles but are included in specific distribution rules, mainly into the 
passive income articles (dividend, Interest, royalties) and in the Other Income article. According to 
these anti-abuse rules, the specific article(s) of the treaty shall not apply if “it was the main purpose 
of a person concerned with the creation or assignment of the shares [or debt claims, or similar assets 
giving rise to income] in respect of which the dividend [or interest, etc.] is paid to take advantage of 
this Article by means of that creation or assignment”.  
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In 2013, the United Kingdom introduced a domestic General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) which 
further refines the main purpose test.168 The GAAR operates independently of existing anti-avoidance 
provisions and in priority to any other anti-avoidance rules. This domestic GAAR prohibits “abusive 
tax arrangements” that are determined by a series of intertwined subjective tests. Section 207 FA 
2013 defines arrangements as abusive if  
(1) “it would be reasonable to conclude that the obtaining of a tax advantage was the main 
purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements” and  
(2) “the entering into or carrying out of [the arrangement] cannot reasonably be regarded as a 
reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions […]”. 
Sec 207(4) FA further provides examples “of something which might indicate that tax arrangements 
are abusive”: 
a) the arrangements result in an amount of income, profits or gains for tax purposes that is 
significantly less than the amount for economic purposes; 
b) the arrangements result in deductions or losses of an amount for tax purposes that is 
significantly greater than the amount for economic purposes; and 
c) the arrangements result in a claim for the repayment or crediting of tax (including foreign 
tax) that has not been, and is unlikely to be, paid. 
With no cases decided yet on grounds of the GAAR, it is impossible to estimate how courts will deal 
with the rule and how the preceding case law will influence the interpretation of the “main purpose 
test” in the 2013 U.K. GAAR. The GAAR though is accompanied with a large body of explanatory 
materials. The so-called GAAR Guidance drafted and published by HMRC is thereby an important 
source for understanding the UK GAAR.169 The Guidance is important as it does not merely reflect 
HMRC’s opinion on the GAAR. Rather, Section 211 FA 2013 (which regulates the proceedings before a 
court or tribunal) even refers to the GAAR Guidance. Section 211(2) FA 2013 thereby provides that in 
determining any issue in connection with the GAAR, a court or tribunal “must take into account (a) 
the GAAR Guidance […] and (b) any opinion of the GAAR Advisory Panel about the arrangements.” 
Accordingly, the GAAR Guidance is given a weight that goes beyond that of other forms of HMRC 
Guidance, which comes very close to attaining legislative weight.170 
                                                          
 
168  See further D. Roxburgh, “General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR)” (2014), 54 European Taxation 2/3, 113-116. 
169  The HMRC GAAR Guidance is available online: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-avoidance-general-anti-abuse-rules 
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Section 207 FA contains several subjective tests: the main purpose test,171 the tax advantage test172 
and the so-called double-reasonableness test173. The main purpose test examines whether the 
taxpayer implemented the arrangement with the intention of obtaining a tax benefit. The term 
“obtaining of a tax advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes” reveal that not 
every (random) purpose that is attributable to an arrangement will be relevant. According to the 
GAAR Guidance, the expressions regarding the “main purpose” have to be given “their normal 
meaning as ordinary English words”.174 Thus, something has the “main” purpose where the purpose 
makes up for the ‘most important’, ‘principal’, ‘leading’ or ‘the largest part’. This sheds only so much 
light on the definition that it is safe to say that it is not the ‘sole’ purpose that is required.175 As with 
the PPT of Action 6 as discussed above, it is unclear which purpose of an arrangement is the main 
purpose, is there a hierarchy between different main purposes and at which levels of this hierarchy 
would the tax related purpose be placed (always on top?). The UK GAAR Guidance provides some 
explanation as to how a “main purpose” can be deduced – where (i) “the arrangement would not 
have been carried out at all were it not for the opportunity to obtain the tax advantage” or where (ii) 
“any non-tax objective was secondary to the benefit of the tax advantage”.176 Moreover, the “one of 
the main purposes” test seeks to establish whether an arrangement that “would otherwise have 
occurred has been reshaped, or has been entered into under different terms and conditions, in order 
to change significantly the tax result that would otherwise have arisen, and where the desired tax 
result is itself a substantial objective.”177   
The UK GAAR however makes the finding of abuse also conditional on the presence of a “tax 
advantage”.178 The criterion “tax advantage” thereby serves a twofold purpose. On the one hand, 
the tax advantage is a separate requirement necessary for the application of the GAAR. Hereby, it 
serves as an absolute factor used to imply the presence of a tax abuse. On the other hand, the 
concept of the tax advantage is also inevitably intertwined with the subjectivity element. This is 
because the actual finding of a tax advantage is the result of a comparison of the arrangement 
actually implemented by the taxpayer with a fictitious arrangement that the taxpayer would have 
                                                          
 
171  See GAAR Guidance, C4.3. 
172  See Section 208 FA 2013; GAAR Guidance, C2.2. 
173  See GAAR Guidance, C5.10.1. 
174  See GAAR Guidance, C3.4. 
175  See M. Seiler, “GAARs and Judicial Anti-Avoidance in Germany, the UK and the EU”, 208. 
176  See GAAR Guidance, C3.5. 
177  See GAAR Guidance, C3.6. 
178  See Section 208 FA 2013. 
  
 
implemented in the absence of the abusive arrangement.179 Section 208 FA 2013 determines that a 
“tax advantage includes  
a) relief or increased relief from tax,  
b) repayment or increased repayment of tax,  
c) avoidance or reduction of a charge to tax or an assessment to tax,  
d) avoidance of a possible assessment to tax,  
e) deferral of a payment of tax or advancement of a repayment of tax, and  
f) avoidance of an obligation to deduct or account for tax.”  
Section 208 FA 2013 seems to be exhaustive, at least at first sight. However, the GAAR Guidance 
states that the definition “is inclusive (i.e., it is not necessarily exhaustive) and is intended to have a 
very wide meaning”180. Furthermore, it states that Section 208 FA 2013 “is intended to cover any 
form of tax benefit, for example: increasing deductions or losses; decreasing income or gains; 
obtaining timing advantages; obtaining or increasing repayments of tax; or ensuring that a potential 
tax charge does not arise or is reduced.”181 Hence, although the definition seems to be very broad, 
there might indeed be tax advantages that are not explicitly listed therein which could spark 
discussions and court proceedings between taxpayers and tax administrations. Compared to the PPT 
in Action 6 though it has to be acknowledged that the UK GAAR at least tries to define the “tax 
advantage” or “tax benefit” respectively. The finding of a “tax advantage” is necessarily linked to the 
subjective element. This is because a tax advantage is not simply given, but has to be deduced from 
comparing the tax results of the arrangement with the tax results of a fictitious arrangement that 
would have been implemented in the absence of the abusive arrangement. The procedure to identify 
this fictitious arrangement is completely obscure, but at least the UK GAAR Guidance does not 
request that the comparator is always the one fictitious arrangement that would give rise to the 
greatest tax liability.182  
Finally, Section 207(2) FA 2013 asks whether the carrying out of the arrangements can be 
“reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action” (the so-called “double-reasonableness 
test”). The double-reasonableness test resembles the main purpose test. The difference is that the 
                                                          
 
179  See M. Seiler, “GAARs and Judicial Anti-Avoidance in Germany, the UK and the EU”, 213. 
180  See GAAR Guidance, C2.2. 
181  See GAAR Guidance, C2.2. 
182  See GAAR Guidance, C2.5: “in ascertaining whether an advantage arises the actual tax position should be compared with another tax 
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main purpose test aims at ascertaining whether the taxpayer entered into an arrangement for the 
purpose of obtaining an advantage. The double-reasonableness test is aimed at ascertaining whether 
a reasonable third party would have also carried out the arrangements. Apparently, the judge is 
required to consider the range of reasonable views that could be held in relation to the 
arrangements. If the judge considers that the arrangements “could reasonably be regarded as a 
reasonable course of action”, the GAAR would not apply.183  
While the traditional “main purpose test” did not get much attention by earlier scientific research, 
the UK GAAR was very negatively received by the tax community. Especially its subjectivity and the 
shifting of the burden of proof to the detriment of the taxpayer were highly criticized.184 However, 
long before the codification of the UK GAAR, the concept of the traditional UK “main purpose test” 
found its way not only into several of UK’s tax treaties but also into the domestic tax law of New 
Zealand. The New Zealand courts established to look at the purpose or effect of the arrangement 
when evaluating it in the light of New Zealand’s general anti-avoidance rule.185 Thus, to constitute tax 
avoidance, an arrangement must have a tax avoidance purpose or an effect (“tax advantage”) that is 
more than merely incidental. Conversely, the pursuit of a valid commercial objective that incidentally 
results in a reduction in tax liability is not tax avoidance. The tax avoidance purpose test though is 
seen as being objective.186 The test examines whether the parties to the transaction/arrangement 
would have entered into the transaction/arrangement even in the absence of a tax advantage. If the 
parties would have entered into it even in the absence of the tax advantage, it does not have a tax 
avoidance purpose.187  
Even if considered an objective test, the judgment whether a transaction/arrangement would contra-
factually not be entered into when it was linked to different tax outcomes, could almost never be 
objective. The lack of objectivity of the “main purpose test“ is illustrated by two court decisions from 
New Zealand by the same judge on the same underlying circumstances with different outcomes – 
                                                          
 
183  See GAAR Guidance, C5.10.2. 
184  See M. Seiler, “GAARs and Judicial Anti-Avoidance in Germany, the UK and the EU”, 220 et seq; M. Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an 
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185  See further Z. Prebble and J. Prebble, “Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of 
Abuse of Law” (2008), 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 4, 151-170. 
186  See further Z. Prebble and J. Prebble, “Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of 
Abuse of Law”, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 4, 151-170. 
187  See further Z. Prebble and J. Prebble, “Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of 
Abuse of Law”, 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 4, 151-170. 
  
 
Case V20188 and Case W33189. Both cases concern a dentist who had been a partner in a partnership 
but left the partnership and established a trading trust structure whereby he was employed by the 
trust. The transaction itself had commercially valid objectives such as to protect assets and limit 
personal liability but it also led to tax savings in various degrees. The tax saving in the tax year 1995 
(Case V20) was minor and thus Judge Barber held that there was no tax avoidance because the tax 
advantage was merely incidental (“the icing on the cake”). However, in the year 1996 (Case W33) the 
tax saving was not only larger but substantial. The larger tax saving influenced Judge Barber to hold 
that the tax avoidance in that year was more than merely incidental and the Court held that the 
arrangement in the second case had a tax avoidance purpose.  
 
4. Anti-Treaty-Abuse measures currently employed by Asian countries 
This paper specifically focuses on the tax treaty policy relating to treaty shopping of eight Asia Pacific 
jurisdictions. These jurisdictions (Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan) are a very diverse group with respect to their levels of economic development, 
their legal origins, their socio-economics and their levels of integration in the global trade system. 
Three of the jurisdictions are OECD Member states,190 which thus at least presumably follow the 
OECD recommendations when negotiating tax treaties and model their treaties closely after the 
OECD-MC. Another two jurisdictions191 belong to the BRICS group, which keeps gaining influence in 
international tax legislation.192 The third group of jurisdictions contains three emerging or high-
income developing countries193 - Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan. The eight jurisdictions selected are 
at varying levels of tax sophistication – with Australia and Japan at one end of the spectrum with 
Malaysia arguably at the other end. They all have negotiated tax treaties that include some form of 
anti-treaty abuse rules. The following section will analyze these treaty networks and present the 
different anti-treaty abuse mechanisms these jurisdictions have employed in their respective tax 
treaties. 
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4.1. The OECD Member States – Australia, Japan and South Korea 
4.1.1. Australia 
Australia currently194 has 44 tax treaties with countries around the world. Geographically, most tax 
treaty partners are located in Europe (22 tax treaties) and in the Asia Pacific Region (16 tax treaties). 
Out of the group of eight jurisdictions analyzed in this paper, Australia has a tax treaty with all of 
them except for Hong Kong. The first tax treaty Australia entered into was the 1946 treaty with the 
U.K. 
Though they are numerous, anti-treaty abuse measures are not included consistently throughout the 
whole Australian treaty network. The measure used most often is the “main purpose test” or a 
version thereof (“MPT”). The treaty network contains 10 provisions that limit or deny the benefits of 
the treaty if obtaining the treaty benefits was a “main purpose” of the respective arrangement or 
transaction. The majority of these MPT provisions however are only applicable to passive income 
(dividends, interests, royalties)195 and are therefore usually found in the respective passive income 
articles of the treaty.196 The treaty with the United Kingdom197 applies the MPT more broadly to 
cover Other Income in addition to the dividend/interest/royalties. The treaty with Switzerland as 
amended by the 2013 Protocol198 applies the MPT provision to the whole treaty and thus scrutinizes 
all treaty benefits accordingly.  
Besides the “main purpose test” the anti-abuse mechanism used most often are subject-to-tax 
clauses. There are eight tax treaties199 with subject-to-tax clauses and/or “Limitation of Relief” (LoR) 
clauses. Subject-to-tax-clauses limit the tax relief granted by a contracting state to the amount that 
has actually been taxed / subject-to-tax in the other state, while a LoR clause limits the amount or 
percentage of tax relief in the source state to the amount or share of income which is actually 
remitted to or paid in the residence state.200 These clauses are not effectively provisions to counter 
                                                          
 
194  As of Feb. 25, 2017. 
195  See the treaties with Chile (Apr. 1, 1973), Finland (Jan. 1, 2008), Ireland (Jul. 1, 1984), Japan (Jan. 1, 2009), Mexico (Jan. 1, 2004), New 
Zealand (May 1, 2010), Norway (Jan. 1, 2008), and South Africa (Jan. 1, 2009). 
196  Except for the treaty with Chile where it is provided for in a separate Article 27. 
197  Applicable as of 1 July 2004. 
198  Applicable as of 1 January 2014. 
199  See the treaties with Argentina (Jan. 1, 2000), Ireland (Jul. 1, 1984), Malaysia (Aug. 9, 2010), Malta (Jan. 1, 1986), Singapore (Dec. 22, 
2010), Thailand (Jan. 1, 1990) and the UK (Jul.1, 2004).  
200  See for example the treaty between Australia and Malaysia (Jan. 1, 1980) or the treaty between Australia and Singapore (Jul. 1, 1969). 
  
 
treaty shopping but to prohibit double non-taxation by relating the treaty benefit in one state to the 
tax treatment in the other state.  
Limitation on Benefits clauses (as found in U.S. treaties and the U.S. Model Tax Treaty) are only 
included in two treaties, the treaties with Japan201 and the United States202 The treaty with the 
United States was first signed in 1982, when it was one of the first treaties to include a specific 
provision for income derived by a trustee in its LoB clause. With a Protocol in 2001 the treaty was 
amended and the LoB clause was modernized to resemble the 1996 U.S. Model Treaty LoB clause 
with some minor changes in the detailed wording. The LoB provision in the treaty with Japan is 
modeled after the 2006 US Model Treaty LoB clause. Altogether though the treaty with Japan 
represents a unique case. The treaty is the only one in the Australian treaty network that contains 
four different concepts of anti-abuse measures. It contains a U.S.-style LoB clause203 for the whole 
treaty, a “main purpose test”204 for passive income, a subject-to-tax clause205 and a specific anti-
treaty-shopping rule206 for passive income. Whether these different but to some degree overlapping 
anti-abuse measures are really necessary and how the interplay of these measures works remains to 
be seen.  
Finally, a number of Australian tax treaties also contain specific anti-abuse or anti-double-non-
taxation rules. These very specific and often rather casuistic provisions target preferential tax 
treatments207 of certain industries (such as banks or insurances208), certain entities209 or certain 
transactions210. Some of these specific anti-abuse measures are coupled with other, more standard 
anti-abuse measures. But as they could also stand alone to form the only anti-abuse measure in the 
treaty no specific trend in the Australian treaty policy could be found in this regard. 
An analysis of the historical development of the Australian Tax Treaty network and the emphasis the 
Australian treaty negotiators put on Anti-Avoidance Measures shows a time trend towards more of 
such measures. Since the year 2000 the total number of Anti-Avoidance Measures increases. 
However, the frequency of Anti-Avoidance measures in Tax Treaties has peaked during the period 
                                                          
 
201  Applicable as of 1 January 2009. 
202  Applicable as of 1 July 2001. 
203  Art 23 of the Australia-Japan Tax Treaty. 
204  Art 10(11), 11(10), 12(8) of the Australia-Japan Tax Treaty. 
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2000-2009 and is declining since. As addressed above, MPT is the preferred measure. Yet, it seems 
again that the usage of that measure is declining over the recent decade.   
Australia Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB 
per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
before 1990  
(first Treaty 
in 1946) 
44 8 0.18 4 0.50 1 0.13 0.25 0 0.00 0.00 
1990-1999 10 14 1.40 6 0.43 1 0.07 0.17 0 0.00 0.00 
2000-2009 10 15 1.50 13 0.87 7 0.47 0.54 2 0.13 0.15 
after 2009 7 7 1.00 3 0.43 1 0.14 0.33 0 0.00 0.00 
Total  71 44 0.62 26 0.59 10 0.23 0.38 2 0.05 0.08 
Table 1 - Historical Development Treaty Network - Australia 
 
4.1.2. Japan 
Japan currently211 has 61 tax treaties with countries around the world, with Europe the geographic 
region with the most treaty partners (29 tax treaties) followed closely by the Asia Pacific region (24 
tax treaties). Out of the group of eight jurisdictions analyzed in this paper, Japan has a tax treaty with 
all of them except for Taiwan. Japan’s first tax treaty negotiated was with the United States which 
became effective in 1955.  
Exactly half (31) of the Japanese tax treaties do not contain an anti-abuse measure of any sort. 
Amongst the 30 tax treaties no specific preference for one of the two measures proposed by Acton 6 
could be distinguished. Japan rather employs a number of different anti-abuse measures and in 
numerous tax treaties (especially the more recent ones) combines two or more of these measures.212 
With respect to the two measures proposed by Action 6, Japan’s tax treaties with the main purpose 
test-provisions (13213) outnumber those with LoB provisions (8214). Similar to the Australian tax treaty 
practice, the MPT provisions are usually exclusively applicable to passive income and are thus 
                                                          
 
211  As of February 25, 2017. 
212  See the tax treaties between Japan and Australia (Jan. 1, 2009), France (Jan. 1, 1997), Netherlands (Jan. 1, 2012), New Zealand (Jan. 1, 
2014), Portugal (Jan. 1, 2014), Sweden (Jan.1, 2015), Switzerland (Jan. 1, 2012), UK (Jan. 1, 2014), US (Jul. 1, 2004). 
213  See the tax treaties between Japan and Australia (Jan. 1, 2009), France (Jan. 1, 1997), Hong Kong (Jan. 1, 2012), Mexico (Jan. 1, 1997), 
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214  See the tax treaties between Japan and Australia (Jan. 1, 2009), France (Jan. 1, 1997), Netherlands (Jan. 1, 2012), New Zealand (Jan. 1, 
2014), Sweden (Jan. 1, 2015), Switzerland (Jan. 1, 2012), UK (Jan. 1, 2014), US (Jul. 1, 2004). 
  
 
incorporated in the respective passive income articles modeled after Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the 
OECD-MC. While the treaty with Mexico reduces the scope of the MPT to royalties and interest only, 
the treaties with France and the United Kingdom expand the MPT to Other Income and the treaty 
with Hong Kong expands it even further to Other Income and capital gains. The LoB provisions are 
modeled after the U.S. model – however all of them, except for the treaty with the United States, are 
limited in their scope to certain items of income and distribution rules. These limitations to the scope 
of the LoB clauses though seem to be rather random and a consistent policy cannot be identified. 
The LoB clauses in the treaties with the Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K. only apply to passive 
income, capital gains and Other Income, while the LoB clause in the treaty with Australia is only 
applicable to business income, dividends, interests and capital gains similar to the respective clause 
in the treaty with France which additionally applies to Other Income as well. The LoB clause in the 
treaty with Sweden is limited to passive income and the one in the treaty with New Zealand is limited 
to interests and capital gains.   
The one anti-abuse measure used most often besides the “main purpose test” is a “Limitation of 
Relief”. There are 13215 tax treaties which have such a clause incorporated in the text. There are 
further twelve216 tax treaties which include a general anti-abuse rule that stipulates that both 
contracting states “will ensure that any exemption or reduced rate of tax granted […] shall not be 
enjoyed by persons not entitled to such benefits.” The two contracting states declare themselves 
responsible to the other contracting state to adhere to this principle – however it is unclear how this 
would be enforced.   
As with the Australian tax treaties the Japanese treaty network also contains a few, very exceptional 
specific anti-abuse measures. The treaty with South Korea contains a highly subjective general anti-
abuse provision which denies all treaty benefits when “the competent authorities of the Contracting 
States agree that the taking advantage of those provisions constitutes an abuse […]”217. The treaty 
with Luxembourg contains a specific provision which denies treaty benefits to Luxembourg holding 
companies established according to the 1929 Act on holding companies.218 Japan’s treaty with 
Malaysia contains an anti-treaty shopping provision in the form of a physical presence / active 
business test which denies treaty benefits if a company does not conduct “substantive activities 
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Kuwait (Jan. 1, 2014), Netherlands (Jan. 1, 2012), New Zealand (Jan. 1, 2014), Pakistan (Jan. 1, 2009), Portugal (Jan. 1, 2014), Singapore 
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216  See the tax treaties between Japan and Canada (Jan. 1, 2001), Finland (Jan. 1, 1992), Kazakhstan (Jan. 1, 2010), Luxembourg (Aug. 18, 
2013), Mexico (Jan. 1, 1997), Netherlands (Jan. 1, 2012), Norway (Jan. 1, 1993), South Africa (Jan. 1, 1998), Sweden (Jan. 1, 2015), 
Turkey (Jan. 1, 1995), U.S. (Jul. 1, 2004), Vietnam (Jan. 1, 1996). 
217  See Art 3 of the 1999 Protocol to the tax treaty between Japan and South Korea. 
218  See Art 25 of the Japan-Luxembourg tax treaty. 
  
 
through a fixed facility”219 in the respective state. The treaty with Singapore contains a similar 
provision.220 The treaty with South Africa contains a kind of “main purpose test” for becoming a 
resident – treaty benefits being denied if the main purpose of becoming a resident in either of the 
contracting states was to benefit from the treaty.221  
The historical analysis of the development of the Japanese Tax Treaty network shows a significant 
time trend towards more Anti-Avoidance Measures (see Table 2 below). Every new Tax Treaty that 
was entered into during the period 2000-2009 had on average two distinct Anti-Avoidance measures. 
While this relation declined slightly after 2009, Japan still maintained the highest Anti-Avoidance 
measure to Tax Treaty ratio of all eight jurisdiction in the sample during that time (1.89 Anti-
Avoidance measures per Tax Treaty). Table 2 also shows a significant change in the preferred 
method. During the early 2000s (2000-2009) Japan negotiated more LoB-clauses per Anti-Avoidance 
measures (0.33) than MPT-clauses (0.22). In recent years however, this practice reversed as Japan 
concluded twice as many MPT-clauses per Anti-Avoidance measure (0.56) than LoB-clauses (0.28). 
Overall, Japan employs MPT-clauses (LoB-clauses) in 21% (23%) of its Treaties.     
Japan Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB 
per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
before 1990  
(first Treaty 
in 1955) 
35 23 0.66 1 0.04 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
1990-1999 10 11 1.10 8 0.73 1 0.09 0.13 0 0.00 0.00 
2000-2009 10 9 0.90 18 2.00 2 0.22 0.11 3 0.33 0.17 
after 2009 7 18 2.57 34 1.89 10 0.56 0.29 5 0.28 0.15 
Total  62 61 0.98 61 1.00 13 0.21 0.21 8 0.13 0.13 
Table 2 - Historical Development Treaty Network - Japan 
 
4.1.3. South Korea 
South Korea currently222 has the second largest tax treaty network of the jurisdictions analyzed in this 
paper with 87 tax treaties. The treaty partners are located all around the world, with Europe the 
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geographic region with the most treaty partners (36 tax treaties) closely followed by the Asia Pacific 
region (33 tax treaties). South Korea is also the jurisdiction in our sample with the most treaties with 
South American countries (8 tax treaties) and second most with African counties (7 tax treaties). Out 
of the group of eight jurisdictions analyzed in this paper, South Korea has a tax treaty with all of them 
except for Taiwan. The first South Korean tax treaty that came into effect was the treaty with Japan 
in 1970. Since then the treaty network expanded rapidly, especially between the early 1990s and 
2010 when the number of tax treaties almost tripled.   
Out of South Korea’s 87 tax treaties, 36 (41% of all South Korean treaties) contain an anti-treaty 
abuse provision of some sort. Many of these 36 treaties even contain two or more anti-abuse 
measures with different scopes of application. The most preferred measure is the “main purpose 
test” being used in 23 of the 36 treaties. When included in the tax treaty, the MPT provision usually 
covers the passive income articles (dividends, interests, royalties) and is mostly provided for in the 
respective distribution rules. However the treaties with Ecuador223, Kuwait224, Kyrgyzstan225 and Saudi 
Arabia226 expand the main purpose test onto the whole treaty and all its distribution rules. In the 
majority of the other treaties that contain a main purpose test this test applies to passive income, 
capital gains and Other Income.227 The treaties with Germany228, Oman229 and the United Kingdom230 
apply the test to passive income and Other Income. A fourth group of treaties on the other hand 
reduce the scope of the main purpose test to either interests and royalties,231 or only interests,232 or 
only royalties.233 A special case is the tax treaty with Pakistan as it provides for a main purpose test 
which exclusively applies to business income, i.e., the attribution of profits to permanent 
establishments.234  
The other anti-abuse measures in South Korea’s tax treaties are mainly anti-treaty shopping rules 
that employ certain aspects (predominantly the ownership test) of the standard U.S. LoB clause. 
These anti-treaty shopping rules usually deny treaty benefits with respect to passive income, capital 
                                                          
 
223  See Art 25(1)(b) of the South Korea-Ecuador tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2014). 
224  See Art 6 of the 2011 Protocol to the South Korea-Kuwait tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2011). 
225  See Art 29 of the South Korea-Kyrgyzstan tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2014). 
226  See Art 27 of the South Korea-Saudi Arabia tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2009). 
227  See the tax treaties between South Korea and Azerbaijan (Jan. 1, 2009), Bahrain (Jan. 1, 2014), Colombia (Jan. 1, 2015), Hong Kong 
(Jan. 1, 2017)), Panama (Jan. 1, 2013), Peru (Jan. 1, 2015), Poland (Protocol 2013 – Jan. 1, 2015), Qatar (Jan. 1, 2010) and Uruguay (Jan. 
1, 2014). 
228  See Art 27(2) of the South Korea-Germany tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2003). 
229  See Art 10(6), 11(9), 12(7) and 22(3) of the South Korea-Oman tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2007). 
230  See Art 10(6), 11(10), 12(7) and 22(4) of the South Korea-United Kingdom tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1997). 
231  See the tax treaties between South Korea and Chile (Jan. 1, 2004), Mexico (Jan. 1, 1996) and Ukraine (Jan. 1, 2003). 
232  See Art 11(9) of the South Korea-Papua New Guinea tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1999). 
233  See Art 12(7) of the South Korea-Uzbekistan tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1999). 
234  See Art 2 of the Protocol to the South Korea-Pakistan tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1987). 
  
 
gains and Other Income to intermediaries, which are directly or indirectly controlled by residents of 
neither of the contracting states.235 This rule is a very mechanical test that denies treaty benefits 
exclusively on the grounds of ownership by a third state resident. A safe harbor or bona fide rule 
such as, for example, an active trade or business test is only very rarely added to the mechanical 
test.236 A traditional, comprehensive LoB clause cannot be found in the South Korean tax treaty 
network. The treaty with the United Arab Emirates contains a limitation on benefits clause – however 
its scope is so broad that it limits the application of the treaty for residents of the United Arab 
Emirates to either individuals or government owned companies.237 Additionally, this LoB clause is 
complemented by a main purpose test that further limits the application of the treaty for UAE 
residents.238 
South Korea Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB 
per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
before 1990  
(first Treaty 
in 1970) 
20 17 0.85 6 0.35 1 0.06 0.17 0 0.00 0.00 
1990-1999 10 27 2.70 8 0.30 4 0.15 0.50 0 0.00 0.00 
2000-2009 10 28 2.80 16 0.57 7 0.25 0.44 1 0.04 0.06 
after 2009 7 15 2.14 21 1.40 11 0.73 0.52 0 0.00 0.00 
Total  47 87 1.85 51 0.59 23 0.26 0.45 1 0.01 0.02 
Table 3 - Historical Development Treaty Network - South Korea 
Analyzing the historical development of the South Korean Tax Treaty network in detail provides a 
consistent and significant trend towards a more pronounced use of Anti-Avoidance Measures over 
time. During all of the four periods presented in Table 3 the total number of Anti-Avoidance 
measures increases (the frequency increases in three of the four eras). The most recent period (after 
2009) is characterized by a strong increase (in total and relative numbers) of Anti-Avoidance 
measures in general and more specifically of MPT-clauses. Every new Treaty has on average 1.4 Anti-
Avoidance measures of which 52% are MPT-clauses. The total number of MPT-clauses almost 
                                                          
 
235  See the tax treaties between South Korea and Bahrain (Jan. 1, 2014), Canada (Jan. 1, 2007), China (Protocol 2006 – Jul. 4, 2016), 
Colombia (Jan. 1, 2015), Ecuador (Jan. 1, 2014), Kuwait (Jan. 1, 2011), Latvia (Jan. 1, 2010), Panama (Jan. 1, 2013), Thailand (Jan. 1, 
2008), Turkey (Jan. 1, 1987), United States (Jan. 1, 1979) and Uruguay (Jan. 1, 2014). 
236  See for example Art 1 of the 2006 Protocol (Jul. 4, 2006) to the South Korea-China tax treaty. 
237  See Art 23(1) and (2) of the South Korea-United Arab Emirates tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2003). 
238  See Art 23(3) of the South Korea-United Arab Emirates tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2003). 
  
 
doubled after 2009 and their usage in new Treaties almost tripled to the previous period (2000-
2009). As addressed above, LoB-clauses do not matter at all.   
 
4.2. China and Hong Kong 
4.2.1. China 
With 99 tax treaties China currently239 has the largest tax treaty network of the jurisdictions analyzed 
in this paper. The treaty partners are located all around the world, with Europe the geographic region 
with the most treaty partners (40 tax treaties) closely followed by the Asia Pacific region (38 tax 
treaties). China is also the jurisdiction in our sample with the most treaties with African countries (11 
tax treaties). From the group of eight jurisdictions analyzed in this paper, China has a tax treaty with 
all of them except for Taiwan. Even if China has the highest number of tax treaties currently in force, 
it has a rather short history of tax treaty negotiations as its first treaties (with Germany, Japan and 
the United Kingdom, respectively) did not became effective until 1985.  
Only 24 of the 99 tax treaties contain some form of anti-treaty abuse provisions. Similar to South 
Korea, the most preferred measure is the main purpose test which is included in 80% (19 tax treaties) 
of the tax treaties that have some form of an anti-abuse provision. Using the main purpose test 
however seems to be a very new feature of the Chinese tax treaty policy since almost all treaties240 
that contain a MPT provision have either been first signed or amended by a protocol after 2009. It is 
also a very persistent treaty policy since 2010. Since then only a handful of tax treaties, especially 
with developing countries, have been concluded that do not contain MPT provisions.241 The main 
purpose test in China’s tax treaties is usually reduced in scope to passive income242 or passive income 
and Other Income243 and therefore is stipulated in the respective treaty articles dealing with 
dividends, interests, royalties and Other Income. In some cases the MPT provision is applicable to the 
                                                          
 
239  As of February 25, 2017. 
240  The treaty with Papua New Guinea went into effect in 1996, the treaty with New Zealand was amended accordingly in 2001 and the 
treaty with Mexico entered into force in 2006. 
241  See the tax treaties between China and Ethiopia (Jan. 1, 2013), Nepal (Jan. 1, 2011), Syria (Jan. 1, 2012), Turkmenistan (Jan. 1, 2011), 
Uganda (signed Jan. 11, 2012 – still pending) and Zambia (Jan. 1, 2012). The tax treaty with Ecuador (Jan. 1, 2015) contains an LoB 
clause. 
242  See the tax treaties between China and Belgium (Jan. 1, 2014), Botswana (signed Apr. 2012 – still pending), Finland (Jan. 1, 2011), 
Nigeria (Jan. 1, 2010), and Singapore (Jan. 1, 2011). 
243  See the tax treaties between China and Denmark (Jan. 1, 2013), France (Jan. 1Jan. 1, 2015), Malta (Jan. 1, 2012), Russia (Jan. 1, 2017), 
Switzerland (Jan. 1, 2015), and the United Kingdom (Jan. 1, 2014). 
  
 
whole treaty or all distribution rules respectively,244 while only the treaty with Papua New Guinea 
further reduces the scope of the main purpose test to interests only.245  
China’s treaty network contains four treaties which have a limitation on benefits clause. All of these 
LoB clauses are modeled after the U.S. model LoB clause or a modification thereof.246 They all use 
ownership and base erosion tests as well as safe harbor provisions for certain types of organizations 
such as not-for-profit organizations or publicly traded companies. The treaties with Mexico, Russia 
and the United States supplement the LoB clause with a main purpose test for the entire treaty 
(Mexico) or for passive income and Other Income (Russia, United States). The treaty with Ecuador is 
the only Chinese tax treaty that exclusively employs a LoB clause as the sole anti-treaty shopping 
mechanism. 
As with the other jurisdictions’ tax treaty networks, China’s treaty network also contains a number of 
additional anti-abuse measures. One repeatedly used clause explicitly preserves for both contracting 
states the right to counter treaty-based tax abuse with their domestic tax laws and declares domestic 
anti-abuse rules as conforming with the tax treaty even if such rules would otherwise constitute a 
treaty override.247 The treaty with the Czech Republic contains a highly subjective general anti-abuse 
provision similar to the one found in Article 3 of the 1999 Protocol to the tax treaty between Japan 
and South Korea, which denies all treaty benefits when “the competent authorities of the Contracting 
States agree that the taking advantage of those provisions constitutes an abuse […]”248. A similar 
provision can also be found in Article 4 of the Protocol to the tax treaty between China and Israel. 
Article V of the Protocol to the China-Mexico tax treaty contains a provision denying treaty benefits 
in cases of thin-capitalization, CFC rules and back-to-back loan arrangements.  
China Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB 
per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
before 1990  
(first Treaty 
in 1985) 
5 8 1.60 0 0.00 0 0.00 n/a 0 0.00 n/a 
1990-1999 10 30 3.00 4 0.13 1 0.03 0.25 0 0.00 0.00 
2000-2009 10 34 3.40 7 0.21 2 0.06 0.29 1 0.03 0.14 
                                                          
 
244  See the tax treaties between China and Czech Republic (May 4, 2011), Germany (Jan. 1, 2017), Mexico (Mar. 1, 2006), New Zealand 
(Apr. 1, 2001) and the United States (Nov. 24, 2010). 
245  See Art 11(8) of the China-Papua New Guinea tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1996). 
246  See the tax treaties between China and Ecuador (Jan. 1, 2015), Mexico (Mar. 1, 2006), Russia (Jan. 1, 2017) and the United States (Nov. 
24, 2010). 
247  See for example Art 23 of the China-Denmark tax treaty. 
248  See Art 21(3) of the China-Czech Republic tax treaty. 
  
 
after 2009 7 27 3.86 32 1.19 16 0.59 0.50 3 0.11 0.09 
Total  32 99 3.09 43 0.43 19 0.19 0.44 4 0.04 0.09 
Table 4 - Historical Development Treaty Network - China 
China’s Tax Treaty network expanded very quickly since 1990 with more than three new Treaties per 
year and has thus the fastest growing Treaty network over that time span (only the growth rates of 
Singapore and Hong Kong since 2009 are bigger). The strongest increase of Anti-Avoidance measures 
can be found during the most recent period (after 2009) with 32 total and 1.19 Anti-Avoidance 
measures per new Treaty. Table 4 also shows a strong propensity of negotiating more MPT-clauses in 
recent years. 50% of the new Anti-Avoidance measures are MPTs and almost 60% of the new 
Treaties contain such a clause. At a very low total, yet still significant, China employs more LoB 
clauses since 2009.      
 
4.2.2. Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has a very brief history in tax treaty negotiations as the first treaty came into effect on 
April 1, 2004 (tax treaty with Belgium). Given this, the current overall number of 32 tax treaties249 
with countries all over the world250 is quite impressive. Hong Kong has 17 European tax treaty 
partners, 12 from the Asia Pacific region, treaties with Canada and Mexico in North America and a tax 
treaty with one country in Africa (South Africa). Out of the group of eight jurisdictions analyzed in 
this paper, Hong Kong has a tax treaty (or tax treaty equivalent) with China, Japan, Malaysia and 
South Korea.  
Hong Kong’s tax treaties in large part contain measures to curb tax abuse and treaty shopping. Only 5 
of the 32 tax treaties (15%) do not contain any anti-abuse rules.251 Twenty tax treaties contain a 
general anti-abuse rule which preserves the right of each party to the treaty “to apply its domestic 
laws and measures concerning tax avoidance”252. In many of its treaties, these general anti-abuse 
provisions are further supplemented with more specific anti abuse rules. Some treaties however also 
include either only the above-mentioned general rule or only a more specific provision. With regards 
to the specific anti-treaty shopping rules, the main purpose test is again the most commonly used. 
Thirteen treaties contain such a provision. Six of these thirteen treaties limit the application of the 
                                                          
 
249  As of February 25, 2017. 
250  Hong Kong has no tax treaty with a country in South America. 
251  See the tax treaties between Hong Kong and Austria (Apr. 1, 2012), Hungary (Apr. 1, 2012), Ireland (Apr. 1, 2012), Liechtenstein (Apr. 1, 
2012) and Malaysia (Apr. 1, 2013). 
252  See e.g., Art 27 of the Hong Kong-Belgium tax treaty. 
  
 
respective MPT provisions to passive income,253 four treaties limit it to passive income, capital gains 
and Other Income,254 while the treaties with France255 and the United Kingdom256 limit the scope to 
passive income and capital gains or passive income and Other Income, respectively. A further 
exception is the treaty with Brunei which applies the main purpose test on technical service fees and 
on passive income.257 In addition, Hong Kong’s tax treaties contain several other anti-abuse rules – 
for example, applying an ownership test to deny treaty benefits of companies held/controlled by 
third country residents.258 None of Hong Kong’s treaties contain a LoB-clause.  
Hong Kong Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB 
per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
2000-2009 
(first Treaty 
in 2004) 
6 3 0.50 3 1.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
after 2009 7 29 4.14 33 1.14 13 0.45 0.39 0 0.00 0.00 
Total  13 32 2.46 36 1.13 13 0.41 0.36 0 0.00 0.00 
Table 5 - Historical Development Treaty Network - Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has a very short history of sovereign Tax Treaty negotiations; however, this short history 
is characterized by a very strong emphasis on Anti-Avoidance measures. On average every Treaty 
contains of 1.13 Anti-Avoidance measures. While MPT provisions were not used during Hong Kong’s 
first six years of Treaty negotiations (2004-2009), since 2009 45% of new Treaties include a MPT-
clause (13 of 29 Treaties).  
 
4.3. Three Emerging Economies – Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan 
4.3.1. Malaysia 
Malaysia has the fourth largest tax treaty network of the eight jurisdictions in our study with 73 
treaties around the world.259 It has a treaty with all other jurisdictions in our study. The largest 
                                                          
 
253  See the tax treaties between Hong Kong and Canada (Apr. 1, 2014), Indonesia (Apr. 1, 2012), Italy (Aug. 14, 2015), New Zealand (Apr. 1, 
2012), Qatar (Apr. 1, 2014) and South Africa (Oct. 20, 2015). 
254  See the tax treaties between Hong Kong and Japan (Aug. 14, 2011), South Korea (Sept. 27, 2016), Portugal (Apr. 1, 2013) and Spain 
(Apr. 1, 2012). 
255  See Art 10(6), 11(8), 12(7) and 13(6) of the Hong Kong-France tax treaty (Apr. 1, 2012). 
256  See Art 10(6), 11(7), 12(7) and 20(6) of the Hong Kong-U.K. tax treaty (Apr. 1, 2011). 
257  See Art 10(5), 11(8), 12(7) and 13(7) of the Hong Kong-Brunei tax treaty (Apr. 1, 2011). 
258  See Art 26(3) of the Hong Kong-Canada tax treaty (Apr. 1, 2014), Art 9 of the Protocol to the Hong Kong-Mexico tax treaty (Apr. 1, 
2014), Art 10(8), 11(5), 12(7) and 21(3) of the Hong Kong-Switzerland tax treaty (Apr. 1, 2013). 
259  As of February 25, 2017. 
  
 
number of treaty partners by region are in the Asia Pacific (36 tax treaties) followed by Europe (27 
tax treaties). However, it does not have a treaty with the United States. The first ever treaty was 
signed in 1962 (effective August 30, 1963) with the United Kingdom. Almost 70% of Malaysia’s tax 
treaties (50 treaties) do not contain an anti-abuse provision of any sort. Of the treaties that do, most 
often employed are Limitation of Relief (“LoR”) clauses, followed by main purpose tests and subject-
to-tax clauses. Traditional LoB clauses in the sense of Art X(1)(5) of Action 6 are nowhere to be found 
in the current Malaysian tax treaty network. 
The most often employed LoR clause limits the amount or percentage of treaty-based tax relief in the 
source state to the amount or share of income which is actually remitted to or paid in the residence 
state.260 Six of these LoR clauses are additionally intertwined with a subject-to-tax clause that denies 
the relief altogether if the income had not been taxed or properly declared and assessed in the other 
contracting state.261 
The main purpose test, which denies treaty benefits when the main purpose or one of the main 
purposes of an arrangement or a transaction was to take advantage of the respective treaty, is 
provided for in seven of Malaysia’s tax treaties. A consistent treaty policy with regards to the scope 
of application of these MPT provisions however cannot be observed. The treaty with India applies 
the MPT to all income / distribution rules of the treaty.262 The treaties with Chile263 and the United 
Kingdom264 apply the test to all items of passive income, while the treaty with Kazakhstan265 limits 
the application to royalties and interests. The narrowest scope of MPT application – interests only – 
is contained in the treaties with New Zealand266 and Papua New Guinea267. In the Malaysia-Poland 
treaty, the MPT applies to passive income and technical service fees.268 
Besides the more often used LoR clauses and the MPT, Malaysia’s tax treaties contain several very 
specific anti-abuse measures. The treaties with India and Spain contain an active trade or business 
                                                          
 
260  The 17 tax treaties which employ such a Limitation of Relief clause are the treaties with: Australia (Jan. 1, 1980), Canada (Jan. 1, 1981), 
Denmark (Protocol -- Jan. 1, 2003), Germany (Protocol -- Jan. 1., 2011), Ireland (Protocol -- Jan. 1, 2012), Italy (Jan. 1, 1977), 
Luxembourg (Jan. 1, 2005), Myanmar (Jan. 1, 2009), Netherlands (Protocol -- Jan. 1, 2011), New Zealand (Protocol –Jan. 12, 2016), 
Pakistan (Jan. 1, 1980), Papua New Guinea (Jan. 1, 2000), South Korea (Jan. 1, 1983), Sweden (Jan. 1, 2006), Taiwan (Jan. 1, 2000), 
Thailand (Jan. 1, 1983), United Kingdom (Jan. 1, 2000). 
261  See the treaties between Malaysia and Australia (Jan. 1, 1980), Canada (Jan. 1, 1981), Germany (Protocol -- Jan. 1, 2011), Netherlands 
(Protocol -- Jan. 1, 2011), New Zealand (Protocol –Jan. 12, 2016), Pakistan (Jan. 1, 1980). 
262  See Art 28(2) of the Malaysia-India tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2013). 
263  See Art 10(6), 11(7) and 12(7) of the Malaysia-Chile tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2009). 
264  See Art 10(6), 11(7) and 12(7) of the Malaysia-U.K. tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2000). 
265  See Art 11(8) and 12(7) of the Malaysia-Kazakhstan tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2011). 
266  See Art 1(a) of the 1994 Protocol to the Malaysia-New Zealand tax treaty (Jul. 1, 1996). 
267  See Art 11(10) of the Malaysia-Papua New Guinea tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2000). 
268  See Art 10(6), 11(8), 12(7) and 13(7) of the Malaysia-Poland tax treaty (Protocol – Jan. 1, 2015). 
  
 
test.269 The treaty with Spain also provides for an anti-treaty shopping measure denying treaty 
benefits with respect to passive income and capital gains to companies (in)directly held/controlled by 
third country residents.270 And, as mentioned above, the treaty with Japan employs a substantive 
physical presence test, which denies treaty benefits if a company does not conduct “substantive 
activities through a fixed facility”271 in the respective state.  
Malaysia Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB 
per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
before 1990  
(first Treaty 
in 1963) 
27 17 0.63 4 0.24 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
1990-1999 10 11 1.10 1 0.09 1 0.09 1.00 0 0.00 0.00 
2000-2009 10 30 3.00 10 0.33 2 0.07 0.20 0 0.00 0.00 
after 2009 7 15 2.14 12 0.80 4 0.27 0.33 0 0.00 0.00 
Total  54 73 1.35 27 0.37 7 0.10 0.26 0 0.00 0.00 
Table 6 - Historical Development Treaty Network - Malaysia 
Malaysia’s Tax Treaty network contains the lowest ratio of Anti-Avoidance measures per Tax Treaty 
of the whole sample with 37%. Table 6 also shows Malaysia’s reluctance of negotiating MPTs. Only 
seven Treaties (less than 10%) contain such a clause. Notwithstanding the small total number of 
MPTs, its usage seems to be increasing over the last 7 years. The number of Treaties containing such 
a provisions more than doubled after 2009 and also the MPT-to-Anti-Avoidance-measure ratio 
increased by more than 50% since 2009.  
 
4.3.2. Singapore  
Singapore currently272 has the third largest tax treaty network of the jurisdictions analyzed in this 
paper with 82 tax treaties, which is remarkable considering Singapore’s size and population. The 
treaty partners are located all around the world, with Europe being the geographic region with the 
most treaty partners (40 tax treaties) followed by the Asia Pacific region (31 tax treaties). Singapore 
also has a tax treaty with all of the jurisdictions analyzed in more depth in this paper, except for Hong 
                                                          
 
269  See Art 28(3) of the Malaysia-India tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2013), Art 5(b) of the Protocol to the Malaysia-Spain tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2008). 
270  See Art 5(a) of the Protocol to the Malaysia-Spain tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2008). 
271  See Art 5(a) of the 1999 Protocol to the Malaysia-Japan tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2000). 
272  As of February 25, 2017. 
  
 
Kong. However, Singapore like Malaysia does not have a treaty with the United States. The first tax 
treaties concluded by Singapore were those with Malaysia, Norway and the United Kingdom, all in 
1966.  
Singapore’s anti-treaty abuse policy is straightforward and consistent. It rests on two pillars: 
Limitation on Relief provisions (in 39 tax treaties) and main purpose test provisions (in 18 tax 
treaties). While more than 58% of Singapore’s treaties contain some sort of anti-abuse rules, 34 tax 
treaties employ no anti-treaty abuse provision. The treaties which contain anti-abuse rules very often 
contain multiple provisions – mostly Limitation of Relief rules and main purpose test provisions, but 
sometimes also a general anti-avoidance rule. Limitation on benefits clauses are not employed by 
any of Singapore’s existing 82 tax treaties. 
The scopes of application of the main purpose test provisions in Singapore’s tax treaties are rather 
diverse: six treaties apply the test to the whole treaty,273 five treaties apply it exclusively to passive 
income,274 three treaties reduce the application of the test to the distribution rules for interests and 
royalties,275 and the treaty with New Zealand276 reduces the scope of the test to dividends and 
royalties. The narrowest scope of application however is the MPT provision in the treaty with Brunei 
where it is only applicable to interests.277  
Among the other miscellaneous anti-abuse rules in Singapore’s tax treaty network, a few are 
especially noteworthy – five treaties contain a general anti-avoidance clause, which preserves the 
right of each party to the treaty “to apply its domestic laws and measures concerning tax 
avoidance”278. The treaty with Japan279 contains an anti-treaty shopping provision in the form of a 
physical presence / active business test which denies treaty benefits if a company does not conduct 
“substantive activities through a fixed facility” 280 in the respective state. The treaty with India 
contains an anti-conduit rule, that applies a form of the active trade or business test and denies 
                                                          
 
273  See Article 27 of the Singapore-Ecuador tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2016); Art 22(3) of the Singapore-Estonia tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2009); Art 22(3) 
of the Singapore-Finland tax treaty (Apr. 30, 2010); Art 28 of the Singapore-France tax treaty (Jun. 1, 2016); Art 3(1) of the 2005 
Protocol to the Singapore-India tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2008); Art 22(3) of the Singapore-Latvia tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2002). 
274  See Art 10(6), 11(8), 12(7) of the Singapore-China tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2008); Art 10(8), 11(9), 12(7) of the Singapore-Oman tax treaty 
(Jan. 1, 2008); Art 10(8), 11(8), 12(7) of the Singapore-Poland tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2015) – note: according to Art 4(d) of the 2005 Protocol 
to the Singapore-Poland treaty, the MPT is also applicable to the tax sparing clause; Art 1(d) of the 2011 Protocol to the Singapore-
Spain tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2013); Art 10(7), 11(9), 12(8) of the Singapore-U.K. tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1999). 
275  See Art 11(8), 12(7) of the Singapore-Mexico tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1996); Art 11(10), 12(7) of the Singapore-Romania tax treaty (Jan. 1, 
2003); Art 11(8), 12(7) of the Singapore-Ukraine tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2010). 
276  See Art 10(6), 12(7) of the Singapore-New Zealand tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2011). 
277  See Art 11(8) of the Singapore-Brunei tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2007). 
278  See Art 26 of the Singapore-China tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2008); Art 11(b) of the 2013 Protocol to the Singapore-Czech Republic tax treaty 
(Jan. 1, 2016); Art 27 of the Singapore-Ecuador tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2016); Art 9(c)(i) of the 2005 Protocol to the Singapore-Israel tax 
treaty (Jan. 1, 2007); Art 1(a)-(c) of the 2011 Protocol to the Singapore-Spain tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2013). 
279  See also above. 
280  See Art 22(2) of the Japan-Singapore tax treaty. 
  
 
treaty benefits to resident companies with “negligible or nil business operations or with no real and 
continuous business activities”281 carried out in the residence state. Finally, the treaty with Mauritius 
employs an anti-harmful tax competition rule under which the Article 10, 11 and 12 benefits are not 
applicable with respect to companies subject to preferential tax treatments in Mauritius.282  
Singapore Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
before 1990  
(first Treaty 
in 1966) 
24 5 0.21 5 1.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
1990-1999 10 7 0.70 9 1.29 1 0.14 0.11 0 0.00 0.00 
2000-2009 10 18 1.80 15 0.83 6 0.33 0.40 0 0.00 0.00 
after 2009 7 52 7.43 34 0.65 11 0.21 0.32 0 0.00 0.00 
Total  51 82 1.61 63 0.77 18 0.22 0.29 0 0.00 0.00 
Table 7 - Historical Development Treaty Network - Singapore 
Singapore expanded its Tax Treaty network after 2009 by more than seven Treaties per year. The 
emphasis on Anti-Avoidance measures however seems to have declined but is still at a high level. 
65% of those new Tax Treaties contain an Anti-Avoidance measure, which is a reduction by 18 
percentage points to the previous period (2000-2009). Table 7 also presents an increase of the total 
number of MPT-clauses after 2009. Again this increase is not as pronounced as it was during the 
early 2000s (2000-2009). 
 
4.3.3. Taiwan 
The smallest tax treaty network of the jurisdictions in our study is that of Taiwan. Taiwan currently283 
has 28 tax treaties with thirteen European, ten Asia Pacific, four African and one South American 
country. Within our sample of eight Asia Pacific jurisdictions, Taiwan has tax treaties with Australia, 
Malaysia and Singapore, which was also the first country to conclude a tax treaty with Taiwan in 
1982.  
                                                          
 
281  See Art 3(1)-(4) of the 2005 Protocol to the Singapore-India tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2008). 
282  See Art 2 of the 1995 Protocol to the Singapore-Mauritius tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1997). 
283  As of February 25, 2017. 
  
 
16 tax treaties contain some sort of anti-abuse rule, with the main purpose test being the 
predominantly used anti-abuse measure (10 tax treaties). Three treaties contain limitation of relief 
clauses which limit the amount or percentage of tax relief in the source state to the amount or share 
of income which is actually remitted to or paid in the residence state.284 Interestingly, there is one 
treaty that employs a limitation on benefits clause.285 In all of the treaties that contain the MPT, it is 
applied to the entire treaty,286 with the sole exception of the treaty with the United Kingdom287 
wherein the MPT is applicable only to passive income. Further, the treaties with Denmark288 and 
Sweden289 contain subject-to-tax clauses for income in connection to certain activities (e.g., finance, 
headquarters activities, etc.). The treaty with India contains an anti-conduit rule, based on an active 
trade or business test.290  
Taiwan Years  
Number 
of Tax 
Treaties 
Treaties 
per 
Year 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
(Total) 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measures 
per Treaty 
MPT 
MPT 
per 
Treaty 
MPT per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
LoB 
LoB 
per 
Treaty 
LoB per 
Anti-
Avoidance 
Measure 
before 1990  
(first Treaty 
in 1982) 
8 1 0.13 1 1.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
1990-1999 10 8 0.80 0 0.00 0 0.00 n/a 0 0.00 n/a 
2000-2009 10 8 0.80 9 1.13 2 0.25 0.22 1 0.13 0.11 
after 2009 7 11 1.57 18 1.64 8 0.73 0.44 0 0.00 0.00 
Total  35 28 0.80 28 1.00 10 0.36 0.36 1 0.04 0.04 
Table 8 - Historical Development Treaty Network - Taiwan 
Taiwan started to consistently negotiate Anti-Avoidance measures in 2000. Since then every new 
Treaty contains on average of 1.38 Anti-Avoidance rules. This rate has been steadily increasing and 
ranges at 1.64 Anti-Avoidance measures per Treaty by 2016. While the results in Table 8 do not show 
any preference between MPTs and LoBs during the early 2000s (2000-2009), the trend is quite clear 
                                                          
 
284  See Art 22 of the Taiwan-Malaysia tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2000); Art 17 of the Taiwan-Singapore tax treaty (Jan. 1, 1982); Art 23(1) of the 
Taiwan-U.K. tax treaty (Dec. 23, 2002). 
285  See Art 26(1) of the Taiwan-Denmark tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2006). 
286  See Art 25 of the Taiwan-Austria tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2015); Art 27 of the Taiwan-Belgium tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2006); Art 26(3) of the 
Taiwan-Denmark tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2006); Art 27(1) of the Taiwan-France tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2011); Art 26 of the Taiwan-Hungary tax 
treaty (Jan. 1, 2011); Art 28(1) of the Taiwan-India tax treaty (Aug. 12, 2011); Art 27(1) of the Taiwan-Israel tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2010); Art 
26 of the Taiwan-Kiribati tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2015); Art 27 of the Taiwan-Luxembourg tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2015); Art 26(1) of the Taiwan-
Slovakia tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2012); Art 26(3) of the Taiwan-Switzerland tax treaty (Dec. 13, 2011). 
287  See Art 10(6), 11(7), 12(7) and 23(1) of the Taiwan-U.K. tax treaty (Dec. 23, 2002). 
288  See Art 26(1) of the Taiwan-Denmark tax treaty (Jan. 1, 2006). 
289  See Art 26 of the Taiwan-Sweden tax treaty (Nov. 24, 2004). 
290  See Art 28(2) of the Taiwan-India tax treaty (Aug. 12, 2011). 
  
 
after 2009. The usage of MPTs increased consistently in total numbers, per new Treaty and per Anti-
Avoidance measure after 2009.  
 
5. Going Forward – Some policy implications 
The analysis of the tax treaty networks of eight Asia Pacific jurisdictions provides a timely snapshot of 
the tax treaty abuse policy positions of these jurisdictions (see Table 10 below for an overview).291 
Overall, the eight jurisdictions have a total of 506 tax treaties currently in force or signed but 
ratification still pending. On average this is more than 63 tax treaties per jurisdiction. China has the 
largest tax treaty network with 99 treaties, followed by South Korea (87) and Singapore (82), with 
Taiwan having the smallest treaty network (28 treaties). Geographically the treaty networks are truly 
global. Overall European countries are most often the “other contracting state” (with 224 treaties) 
followed by Asia Pacific (200), the Americas (43) and Africa (29). Malaysia is the only country in the 
sample that has more treaties with other Asia Pacific jurisdictions (36) than with European countries 
(27). The majority of the tax treaties are modeled after the OECD-MC especially those concluded with 
OECD member states. Elements of the UN Model Convention can also be found in some of the 
treaties, in particular those between developing countries as well as rather autochthone rules.  
Jurisdiction Europe Asia Pacific 
North  
America 
South  
America 
Africa 
Australia 22 16 3 2 1 
China 40 38 3 7 11 
Hong Kong 17 12 2 0 1 
Japan 29 24 3 2 3 
Malaysia 27 36 1 2 7 
Singapore 40 31 2 4 5 
South Korea 36 33 3 8 7 
Taiwan 13 10 0 1 4 
Total 224 200 17 26 39 
Table 9 - Tax Treaty Partners by Geographic Region 
                                                          
 
291  More than 100 jurisdictions, including all of the eight Asia Pacific jurisdictions except for Taiwan studied in this paper, have committed 
to fast tracking the incorporation and implementation of certain minimum standard BEPS recommendation into existing tax treaties. 
On 24 November 2016, the OECD released The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS 
(the “Multilateral Instrument“ or “MLI“) which was the result of the BEPS Action 15 work and, according to the OECD press release 
accompanying the Multilateral Instrument, will “implement minimum standards to counter treaty abuse and to improve dispute 
resolution mechanisms while providing flexibility to accommodate specific tax treaty policies.“  The text and the related explanatory 
statement have been formally adopted by approximately 100 countries. According to the official OECD information brochure 
accompanying the release of the MLI, MLI is “intended to transpose results from the OECD/G20 BEPS Project into more than 2,000 
[existing] treaties worldwide,” With the first high-level signing ceremony expected to take place in early June 2017, in relation to BEPS 
Action 6 and the issue of whether to adopt PPT or LOB (or a combination of both) in their respective treaties, it is expected that 
countries will in a relatively short period of time determine which BEPS Action 6 recommended approach to adopt and register their 
decision pursuant to the MLI with the OECD. 
  
 
With respect to the overall use of anti-abuse rules in the bilateral tax treaties, the analysis of the tax 
treaty networks of the eight jurisdictions shows a rather heterogeneous impression (see Table 10 
below for an overview). The percentage of tax treaties that include anti-abuse rules of any sort 
ranges from 24.24% (China – 24 tax treaties) to 84.38% (Hong Kong – 27 tax treaties) and is in total 
43.48% (220 tax treaties). The absolute numbers have Singapore in first place with 48 (out of 82) tax 
treaties including an anti-abuse rule of any sort, followed by South Korea with 35 (out of 87) and 
Japan with 30 (out of 61).  
While the use of anti-abuse rules in general is not comprehensive and highly diverse, the choice of 
the preferred measure if an anti-abuse rule is incorporated into the treaty is quite homogeneous. 
The one measure most often used is clearly the main purpose test, with 113 individual treaties 
containing the test. This represents 22.33% of all treaties and 34.66% of all anti-abuse measures in 
the treaties.  
Jurisdiction 
Number of 
Tax Treaties 
LoB-
Clause 
MPT LoR Other None 
Australia 44 2 10 9 5 27 
China 99 4 19 1 21 75 
Hong Kong 32 0 13 2 23 5 
Japan 61 8 13 13 20 31 
Malaysia 73 0 7 17 5 50 
Singapore 82 0 18 39 8 34 
South Korea 87 1 23 5 14 52 
Taiwan 28 1 10 3 12 12 
Total 506 16 113 89 108 286 
Table 10 - Tax Treaties and Anti-Abuse Rules 
The Limitation on Benefits clause on the other hand is the least applied anti-abuse rule with only 16 
LoB clauses in all 506 treaties reviewed. Thus only 3.16% of the treaties include an LoB clause. Japan 
has the most (8) LoB clauses in its treaties, while three jurisdictions (Hong Kong, Malaysia and 
Singapore) do not have a single LoB clause in their current treaty network. 
As mentioned above, the jurisdictions are somewhat diverse in their anti-abuse policy. From the 
Australian tax treaties, one could conclude that anti-treaty shopping measures are not one of the 
main priorities of the overall Australian tax treaty policy. More than 60% of Australia’s treaties do not 
have an anti-abuse rule. Within the 17 treaties that include an anti-abuse measure of any sort, the 
“main purpose test” is the one most utilized. When including anti-abuse measures in the treaty 
though the Australian tax treaty policy seems to not only rely on one measure but often times 
combines a number of different, sometimes even overlapping provisions.  
Anti-treaty shopping measures seem to be of more importance to the Japanese tax treaty 
negotiators as slightly more than 50% of Japan’s existing treaties have at least one anti-abuse rule. 
  
 
The treaties, which have been negotiated and signed more recently all have some sort of an anti-
abuse rule. Within the 31 treaties that include an anti-abuse measure, the “main purpose test”, 
subject-to-tax clauses and a general anti-abuse clause committing the contracting states are the 
measures most utilized. Notably, almost every tax treaty that includes an anti-abuse measure usually 
contains a number of different, sometimes even overlapping anti-abuse provisions. Even though 
Japan has the most LoB clauses in its tax treaties as compared to the other seven jurisdictions, 
however within the Japanese treaty network the LoB-clause is still the least utilized anti-abuse rule 
within the existing Japanese treaty network. 
Based on the review of the existing treaties, the South Korean tax treaty policy has a strong focus on 
negotiating main purpose test provisions as the preferred anti-treaty shopping measure. South Korea 
has the highest absolute number of MPT provisions in its tax treaties (23) and also the highest 
relative share of MPT among the anti-abuse rules availed of (53.49%). While, most of the specific 
treaty provisions are applicable to passive income, capital gains and other income, deviations from 
this practice are also quite numerous with either extended or limited scopes for the MPT provision 
found in certain treaties. The second most important anti-abuse measure is a specific anti-treaty 
shopping rule that denies treaty benefits to intermediaries held/controlled by non-residents of either 
contracting states.  
China has, at least in the last 10 years, developed a very clear tax treaty policy with regards to anti-
treaty shopping. China strongly prefers the main purpose test, especially when (re-)negotiating tax 
treaties with OECD member states. The MPT provisions in China’s tax treaty network are usually 
applicable only to passive income (and other income in certain cases). Usually the specific anti-treaty 
shopping rules are supplemented by a more general rule which declares that domestic general anti-
avoidance rule (GAAR) a priori as not treaty overriding. However not only the numerous application 
of the main purpose test in the most recent tax treaties shows the preference of Chinese tax policy 
for the test, also the 2008 introduced and since then constantly evolving general anti abuse rule of 
the Chinese domestic income tax act.292 The Chinese GAAR also includes a purpose test, which denies 
claimed tax benefits for transactions/arrangements that do not have “a reasonable business 
purpose”293. As with all other principal or main purpose tests, the Chinese GAAR focuses on the 
                                                          
 
292  See J. van der Pas, “Improving the Chinese General Anti-Avoidance rule: A Comparative and Functional Approach”, 8 World Tax Journal 
1, 79-120. 
293  See J. van der Pas, “Improving the Chinese General Anti-Avoidance rule: A Comparative and Functional Approach”, 8 World Tax Journal 
1, 79-120. 
  
 
“main purpose” of the transaction – however, guidance as to how this main purpose can be 
identified is very limited.294  
Tax avoidance and treaty shopping seems to be a high priority agenda from Hong Kong’s tax treaty 
policy perspective. Only 5 of the 32 tax treaties (15%) do not contain any anti-abuse rules. While the 
LoB clause is never used, 13 treaties (40.63%) contain a MPT provision.  
Malaysia’s tax treaty policy, at least until now,  seems to be not overly concerned with treaty abuse 
and treaty shopping as more than two thirds (68.49%) of its treaties do not contain any anti-abuse 
provisions. Among the employed anti-abuse measures the MPT is only ranked second (7 treaties) 
behind the Limitation of Relief provision (17 treaties). Compared to the LoB clause (zero applications) 
the main purpose test seems to be the preferred choice of Malaysia.  
Similar to Malaysia, Singapore’s tax treaty policy seems to prioritize concluding Limitation of Relief 
provisions (39 treaties) over MPT provisions (18 treaties). However, there is a noticeable trend of the 
MPT provision increasingly being added to Singapore’s treaties, especially the more recently signed 
treaties (both new and renegotiated treaties). Almost 60% of Singapore’s treaties contain an anti-
abuse rule. The LoB clause however has not been adopted in any of Singapore’s existing treaties.  
Taiwan which has the smallest tax treaty network of the eight jurisdictions studied in this paper has 
opted for the main purpose test provision as its anti-treaty shopping measure of choice (10 of the 16 
treaties with an anti-abuse rule contains a MPT provision). None of its existing treaties contains a 
Limitation on Benefits provision.  
The overarching historical trend of all eight jurisdictions shows a strong and persistent increase of 
the usage of Anti-Avoidance measures of any sort since the year 2000 (see Figure 1). The total 
number of Anti-Avoidance measures almost doubled from 1999 to 2009 and increased by 126% 
between 2009 and 2016. Every new Treaty negotiated after 2009 contains on average 1.07 Anti-
Avoidance rules. Over the whole observation period 66% of Treaties contain an Anti-Avoidance 
measure of any sort.  
                                                          
 
294  See J. van der Pas, “Improving the Chinese General Anti-Avoidance rule: A Comparative and Functional Approach”, 8 World Tax Journal 
1, 79-120. 
  
 
 
Figure 1 - Anti-Avoidance Measures per Treaty - Total 
Figure 1 also shows the persistent increase of MPTs as the most preferred Anti-Avoidance measure. 
Over the whole observation period MPTs are implemented in 22% of all 506 Treaties analyzed. The 
growth rate of MPTs in newly negotiated Treaties however is steadily increasing (3% before 1990, 8% 
1990-1999, 19% 2000-2009, and 43% after 2009). Figure 1 also depicts the relative unimportance of 
LoB-clauses very impressively.  
This relative unimportance can also be seen from Figure 2, which relates the number of MPTs and 
LoBs to the total number of Anti-Avoidance measures. While the LoB had some increased popularity 
during the early 2000s (9% of new Anti-Avoidance measures were LoBs), this trend seems to 
disappear (4% of new Anti-Avoidance measures were LoBs after 2009). In total LoB-clauses account 
for 5% of Anti-Avoidance measures and are implemented in 3% of all Tax Treaties analyzed. 
 
Figure 2 - MPT and LoB per Anti-Avoidance Measure 
Already before 1990, the most preferred Anti-Avoidance measure is MPT (10% of all Anti-Avoidance 
measures). This rate steadily increases (25%: 1990-1999, 31%: 2000-2009) as 40% of all new Anti-
Avoidance measures after 2009 are MPTs. Over the whole observation period 34% of Anti-Avoidance 
measures are MPTs. And they are implemented in 22% of the Tax Treaties investigated.  
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The analysis shows clearly that for the eight selected Asian jurisdictions, between the PPT and the 
LOB provisions recommended by the BEPS Action 6, the PPT has been the overwhelmingly preferred 
anti-treaty shopping provision in the existing treaties. While the criticism in the literature and also in 
the discussion of this measure above might be justified because of the subjective nature of the PPT 
and the attached difficulties with respect to proving intentions and motives, the eight jurisdictions 
are very likely to opt for the PPT provision in the post-BEPS treaty world. The only exception may be 
Japan which, depending on the other contracting state involved, could opt for either the PPT or the 
LoB provisions as the preferred choice. Over the next several years, many of the existing treaties are 
likely to be amended on a fast track basis to incorporate the BEPS Action 6 recommendations under 
the OECD BEPS Multilateral Instrument and many of the new treaties will explicitly contain either the 
PPT or the LoB provisions (or a combination of both). Also, the likely shift of burden of proof under 
the PPT scrutiny towards the taxpayer is a legitimate concern against this measure, especially in 
jurisdictions where clear tax law guidance is lacking. It is of vital importance for taxpayers to 
anticipate the application of PPT scrutiny as a condition precedent to a treaty claim to their existing 
and proposed transactions.   
On a brighter note, compared to the LoB clause with its various highly complex and interrelated 
tests, exceptions and counter-exceptions, the main purpose test might be simpler, more flexible, 
easier to apply and less difficult to agree upon the specific wording during tax treaty negotiations. 
Additionally, the Asia Pacific jurisdictions analyzed in this paper arguably have familiarity and 
experience with the PPT given the prevalence in existing treaties.  
 
 
